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Whistleblowing

Anti-corruption policies: examining and evaluating the integration of agencies and whistleblower systems

PMR — pp. 1-34 2026-11-06 Original Anti-corruption policies: examining and evaluating the integration of agencies and whistleblower systems Ina Kubbe Abstract This article interrogates dominant anti-corruption evaluation models by foregrounding the integration between Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) and whistleblower systems as a critical yet underexamined determinant of institutional effectiveness. Drawing on institutional theory, regulatory governance, and structured cross-country comparison, it develops a four-part typology of ACA–whistleblower integration regimes (complementary, substitutive, fragmented, and minimalist) based on document-based qualitative evaluation across 13 countries. The findings suggest that institutional coordination and interoperability, rather than the formal existence of anti-corruption institutions alone, are consistently associated with stronger enforcement capacity, greater institutional legitimacy, and higher public trust. The study challenges checklist-based global evaluation models that privilege institutional presence over institutional interaction and proposes an integration-centred framework for assessing integrity systems. By shifting attention from institutional design to institutional integration, the study offers a context-sensitive diagnostic approach for evaluating anti-corruption governance across diverse political and administrative settings.

Fighting Corruption Through Accountability? A Survey Experiment

PA — 2026-04-07 Original Fighting Corruption Through Accountability? A Survey Experiment Ming‐feng Kuo, Hsini Huang Abstract ABSTRACT Democratic Weberian bureaucracy is facing great challenges upholding public values as we see turbulent party politics disrupt merit‐based systems, causing bureaucrats' goal displacement and conflicting compliance under multiple accountability mechanisms. Using vignette experiment design, 555 Taiwanese public employees were surveyed to explore how legal, administrative, and social accountabilities influence the perception of black, gray, and white corruption. While respondents accurately identified corruption severity, accountability reminders diminish ethical judgments and are ineffective in explaining whistle‐blowing intention. The study revealed that organizational positions interact differently with accountability reminders in a Weberian bureaucracy. Findings highlight the need to cultivate ethical judgment to shift from external controls to trigger greater perceived accountability to combat corruption. This study sheds light on both felt accountability and corruption theories to reflect existing anti‐corruption strategies.