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Taxation

Imperial Aid and Tax Mobilization in Late Colonial Africa

APSR — pp. 1-21 2026-09-21 Original Imperial Aid and Tax Mobilization in Late Colonial Africa DIDAC QUERALT Abstract In 1929, the British Empire launched a four-decade development initiative to modernize colonial economies without self-government. Known as the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, the program required colonial administrations to raise local taxes to cofinance development projects. This article shows that imperial aid expanded colonial taxation only after organizational reforms in the Colonial Service screened in officials who shared the metropole’s developmental agenda and made tax mobilization incentive-compatible with career advancement. Drawing on original data from 12 African colonies and extensive archival evidence, I show that aid increased tax revenues when patronage-based governors were replaced by career officers and promotion within the Colonial Service became conditional on fiscal performance. These findings highlight how bureaucratic incentives shaped the effectiveness of imperial aid and offer a new explanation for the expansion of fiscal capacity in late colonial Africa.

The economic foundations of powersharing: Evidence from Africa

AJPS — 2026-03-04 Original The economic foundations of powersharing: Evidence from Africa Yannick I. Pengl, Philip Roessler Abstract Abstract How—and with whom—do rulers share power? Existing research focuses on the strategic logic of powersharing. In this paper, we analyze its economic foundations. Powersharing is modeled as a subnational fiscal contract, in which rulers allocate political representation based on constituencies’ revenue potential. Empirically, we combine historical geospatial data on different types of primary commodity production—mineral point resources and diffuse smallholder cash crop agriculture—with the ethnic affiliation of cabinet ministers across 15 African countries. We find that cash crop groups are overrepresented in post‐independence cabinets, while mining or food crop production does not translate into higher shares of power. Consistent with a revenue bargaining framework, we find that rulers traded political representation and targeted public services for indirect taxation of cash crops. Overall, this suggests powersharing serves not only as a means to distribute resources and co‐opt potential challengers but also to expand the pie and the rents at the ruler's disposal.