PSJ 54/4 2026-09-07
Original Evolving Contexts and Diverging Strategies: Federalism and the Politics of Immigrant Welfare Exclusion in the US
Ping Xu, Ling Zhu, Sebastian Ege
AJPS — 2026-08-10
Original Durable majority gerrymanders: Where partisan gerrymandering can displace democracy
Maxwell Palmer, Benjamin Schneer
Abstract
Abstract We develop the concept of, and estimation tools for, durable majority gerrymanders : electoral district maps drawn to reduce an opposing political party's probability of winning a majority in a legislative chamber. Directly interpretable, forward‐looking, and motivated by the democratic principle that a party in power should have some chance of losing it, this measure provides new insights into the role of redistricting in state legislative elections. We show that, when map drawers are unconstrained, the ability to create durable majorities is so widespread that at least one party in every state can draw a map where a majority of legislative districts withstand almost any likely future electoral swing. Enacted maps are less durable due to a combination of underlying geography, voter partisanship, and state‐level guidelines. This paper provides the theoretical framework and empirical tools to understand which gerrymandered maps enable state‐level majorities to emerge and to endure.
APSR — pp. 1-11 2026-04-24 Original Legislative Effectiveness, Progressive Ambition, and Electoral Success
DANIELLE M. THOMSEN, SARAH A. TREUL, CRAIG VOLDEN, ALAN E. WISEMAN
Abstract
Are effective state lawmakers more likely than ineffective ones to be elected to Congress? We draw on a new dataset of state legislative effectiveness scores from 1993 to 2018 to examine the relationship between lawmaker effectiveness and the decision to run for, and ultimately be elected to, the U.S. House of Representatives. We find that more effective state lawmakers are more likely to enter Congress than ineffective lawmakers. This pattern is due more to the progressive ambition of candidates than to voter decisions. Specifically, within citizen state legislatures, more effective lawmakers are much more likely to run for U.S. House seats than are their less effective counterparts. In highly professional state legislatures, however, more effective lawmakers are more likely to run for Congress only when presented with the opportunity of an open seat. Our analysis finds no relationship between a state legislator’s lawmaking effectiveness and their likelihood of winning primary or general House elections.
JOP 88/2 pp. 854-866 2026-04-01 Original When Do Legislators Represent Their Constituents? Evidence from Roll-Call and Referendum Votes
John G. Matsusaka
Abstract
This article develops a measure of representation that uses referendum returns to capture constituent opinion and applies it to 4,192 roll-call votes on 33 laws in 10 states. Roll-call votes were congruent with majority/median opinion in a district 66% of the time. Roll-call votes can be explained primarily by legislator ideology, with constituent opinion of secondary importance. The data do not show a reliable connection between congruence and competitive elections, term limits, media attention, and party pressure. The evidence generally supports the predictions of representation theories that emphasize selection of legislators that share constituent ideology and provides little support for theories that emphasize reelection incentives.