Sortition

JOP 88/2 pp. 826-838 2026-04-01 Original Defending Elections Against the Oligarchic Charge Palle Bech-Pedersen Abstract This article counters the claim, advanced by lottocrats, that elections are inherently oligarchic. I begin by examining the theory of elections that sees them as a superior mechanism for selecting candidates, showing that this implication fails to render elections as inherently oligarchic because superiority is context dependent. Next, I demonstrate that the advantage of wealth arising from the cost of disseminating information is empirically contingent and, thus, not attributable to the nature of elections. I then offer a pathway for the deoligarchization of elections, distinguishing between doxastic and structural obstacles to inclusion. I demonstrate how ideology critique and certain structural reforms offer solutions to these obstacles. I conclude by addressing the rebuttal that elections remain very likely to be oligarchic and that sortition fares comparatively better on this front. I argue that this line of argument overlooks the undemocratic implications and risks of oligarchization that would emerge from adopting sortition.

APSR — pp. 1-16 2026-03-03 Original Scrutiny and Recall: Rousseau on Controlling the Executive ARTHUR GHINS Abstract In recent decades, political theorists have drawn on historical thinkers to explore how political elites can be held accountable. Rousseau, however, is often dismissed as reducing accountability to elections and participation to occasional ratification referenda. This article challenges that view. While Rousseau expected an elective aristocracy to execute laws ratified by the people, he also identified two mechanisms—scrutiny and recall—through which citizens could control these representatives. After reconstructing Rousseau’s account, I consider how these mechanisms could be adapted to contemporary democracies. Focused on executive accountability, the model is particularly suited to presidential systems with directly elected presidents. It combines a national jury—a citizens’ assembly chosen by lot and tasked with examining presidential actions—with the possibility of a recall referendum. By uniting deliberative scrutiny with the power to remove the head of state, this approach offers an underexplored complement to recent anti-oligarchic institutional innovations based on sortition.