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Representation

The Gender Gap in Political Careers Under Proportional Representation

·90 字·1 分钟
Polihot 比较政治 Gender Gap Political Careers Proportional Representation Electoral Systems Representation
JOP 88/3 pp. 935-951 2026-07-01 Original The Gender Gap in Political Careers Under Proportional Representation Tobias Nowacki Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 比例代表制下的政治生涯性别差距 Tobias Nowacki 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 性别差距、政治生涯、比例代表制、选举制度、政治代表 DOI: 10.1086/735871 查看原文 →

When Do Legislators Represent Their Constituents? Evidence from Roll-Call and Referendum Votes

·406 字·1 分钟
Polihot 美国政治 政治行为 Representation Roll-Call Votes Referendums State Legislatures Constituent Opinion
JOP 88/2 pp. 854-866 2026-04-01 Original When Do Legislators Represent Their Constituents? Evidence from Roll-Call and Referendum Votes John G. Matsusaka Abstract This article develops a measure of representation that uses referendum returns to capture constituent opinion and applies it to 4,192 roll-call votes on 33 laws in 10 states. Roll-call votes were congruent with majority/median opinion in a district 66% of the time. Roll-call votes can be explained primarily by legislator ideology, with constituent opinion of secondary importance. The data do not show a reliable connection between congruence and competitive elections, term limits, media attention, and party pressure. The evidence generally supports the predictions of representation theories that emphasize selection of legislators that share constituent ideology and provides little support for theories that emphasize reelection incentives.

Do Politicians Listen to Youth Wings? Evidence from an Elite Experiment

·505 字·2 分钟
Polihot 比较政治 政治行为 Youth Wings Elite Experiment Political Parties Representation Policy Responsiveness
JOP 88/2 pp. 586-600 2026-04-01 Original Do Politicians Listen to Youth Wings? Evidence from an Elite Experiment Henrik Bech Seeberg Abstract Most political parties have youth wings. They are major recruitment and campaign vehicles for parties, but do politicians listen to them when it comes to policy positions? Short of research, I provide a first answer to this question via a large-scale survey experiment of politicians across a range of issues. I show that politicians listen to their youth wings not because of who the youth wings are but because of what they say. The politicians do not adjust because the argument comes from the youth wing but because the youth wing takes a more ideologically pure and, therefore, radical stance than the mother party or refer to their expertise on the issue. These results apply particularly to politicians who applaud the youth wings’ policies in general and politicians who are electorally vulnerable. This has important implications for research on political representation and our understanding of preference aggregation in political parties.