Regime Survival

APSR — pp. 1-21 2026-07-15 Original Rebel Victory and Authoritarian (Dis)Order KILLIAN CLARKE, ANNE MENG, JACK PAINE Abstract Many authoritarian regimes originating in violent rebellion are exceptionally durable. Yet others collapse quickly after their birth. We argue that the structure of the founding rebellion explains these divergent trajectories by shaping power-sharing dynamics in the new regime and the nature of conflict recurrence. Regimes founded by unified rebellions (single armed group) usually become highly durable autocracies because their members can credibly share power within the same armed organization. By contrast, regimes founded by fractured rebellions (multiple armed groups) often fail quickly because armed rivals must attempt to share power across their organizations, prompting defections and recurrent rebellions. Empirically, we support these arguments by analyzing originally compiled data on every regime founded by successful rebellion worldwide from 1900 to 2020. Neither alternative rebellion characteristics, like social revolution or leftist ideology, nor country-level factors can explain why rebel regimes follow divergent trajectories.

WP 78/2 pp. 207-250 2026-04-01 Original Reshuffles or Dismissals? The Logic of Elite Management and Autocratic Survival Alexander Baturo, Roman-Gabriel Olar Abstract abstract: Co-optation and repression are central to understanding authoritarian power sharing, but how autocrats implement these strategies with individual elites remains underexplored. The article proposes a theoretical framework conceptualizing dictators as managers of their ruling coalitions who routinely appoint, dismiss, promote, demote, shuffle, or reappoint elites for a mixture of strategic, nonstrategic, or even mundane reasons. The authors argue that autocrats have agency in choosing between dismissals and reshuffles as general elite management strategies. In the process, they alter the information environment and elite incentives with consequences for their own survival. Although dismissals as a general policy reduce elites' power, they also increase intraregime conflict and uncertainty and tend to have adverse effects on ruler survival. In contrast, reshuffles prevent elite coordination but ensure that elites have a stake in regime continuity. These arguments are tested using novel measures of dismissals and reshuffles in autocratic regimes and communist politburos while also considering the mechanisms and alternative explanations driving the results. The findings suggest that autocratic survival relies more on mundane and nonviolent elite management than seen in the predominantly conflictual accounts of authoritarian politics.