Improving Cooperation in Government Purchasing Through Formal‐Relational Contracting
·610 字·2 分钟
PAR — 2026-08-07
Original Improving Cooperation in Government Purchasing Through Formal‐Relational Contracting
Public Procurement
Did populist governance change corruption risks during crises across European countries?
·439 字·1 分钟
PMR — pp. 1-28 2026-06-11 Original Did populist governance change corruption risks during crises across European countries?
Giuliana Ioannidis
Abstract
This study examines whether populist governance shaped public procurement corruption risks during COVID-19 across 23 EU Member States. Despite common emergency rules, corruption risks varied markedly. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the Corruption Risk Index, the study finds that populist governance combined with poor integrity norms is sufficient to explain high corruption risk increases. Populist-led governments intensify risks by undermining oversight, exploiting legal loopholes, and legitimizing rule-breaking through anti-elite narratives, particularly where accountability cultures are weak. Anti-corruption strategies must therefore account for crisis conditions and politicized governance, ensuring independent oversight mechanisms remain intact under populist rule.
Hybrid professionalism in regulatory governance: the reconfiguration of professionalism in the procurement of social services
·134 字·1 分钟
PMR — pp. 1-27 2026-05-23 Original Hybrid professionalism in regulatory governance: the reconfiguration of professionalism in the procurement of social services
Avishai Benish, Avner Gassner, Noa Katz
Dual anchors in the shadow of the future: how renewal expectations and relational history govern behavior in public contracts
·588 字·2 分钟
JPART 36/3 pp. 329-342 2026-04-03 Original Dual anchors in the shadow of the future: how renewal expectations and relational history govern behavior in public contracts