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Public Goods

Varieties of Participation and Investment in Local Public Goods: Evidence from an RCT in Kenya

JOP — 2026-04-01 Original Varieties of Participation and Investment in Local Public Goods: Evidence from an RCT in Kenya Tara Grillos, Michael Touchton Abstract This is a pre-registered report that has been accepted in principle at the Journal of Politics to be published after collection and analysis of the data. Citizen participation is widely believed to improve development outcomes by increasing participants’ willingness-to-invest in development projects. Participatory budgeting is one of the most popular ways to engage the public in policy making. These programs have spread rapidly across the Global South but have rarely been evaluated. Outcomes related to participant behavior likely depend on the specific procedures used to encourage and structure participation. Within the context of participatory budgeting in rural Kenya (a ‘hard test’ of these hypotheses), we randomly assign three commonly used group decision procedures to select development projects at the village level, which are then implemented in each village. In this registered report, we compare treatments across villages in terms of participation in a “community action day” and other behavioral measures of public goods investment. This represents our first step toward assessing how differing participatory designs promote collective action to maintain projects, thereby promoting sustainable development.

Do Elites Know Best? Candidate Selection and Policy Implementation in Postindependence Tanzania

APSR — pp. 1-22 2026-03-23 Original Do Elites Know Best? Candidate Selection and Policy Implementation in Postindependence Tanzania JEREMY BOWLES Abstract How do candidate selection processes shape policy outcomes? Studying Tanzania’s initial single-party legislative elections, I assess how electing candidates preferred by party elites affected policy implementation, which emphasized rural development during this period. Leveraging the deterministic assignment of ballot symbols—which was orthogonal to candidate characteristics but had large electoral effects—finds that their election substantially increased the supply of salient local public goods. Assembling novel candidate-level data, I document that elites prioritized candidates’ national prominence while voters prioritized their local ties. Rather than representing misaligned incentives, the results are consistent with elites, in an incipient regime, more quickly understanding which characteristics would matter for candidates’ performance in office. Beyond highlighting novel conditions under which elite-led candidate selection facilitates responsiveness, the results underscore the distributive consequences of candidate selection even in nondemocratic settings.