Power-Sharing

APSR — pp. 1-21 2026-07-15 Original Rebel Victory and Authoritarian (Dis)Order KILLIAN CLARKE, ANNE MENG, JACK PAINE Abstract Many authoritarian regimes originating in violent rebellion are exceptionally durable. Yet others collapse quickly after their birth. We argue that the structure of the founding rebellion explains these divergent trajectories by shaping power-sharing dynamics in the new regime and the nature of conflict recurrence. Regimes founded by unified rebellions (single armed group) usually become highly durable autocracies because their members can credibly share power within the same armed organization. By contrast, regimes founded by fractured rebellions (multiple armed groups) often fail quickly because armed rivals must attempt to share power across their organizations, prompting defections and recurrent rebellions. Empirically, we support these arguments by analyzing originally compiled data on every regime founded by successful rebellion worldwide from 1900 to 2020. Neither alternative rebellion characteristics, like social revolution or leftist ideology, nor country-level factors can explain why rebel regimes follow divergent trajectories.

JOP — 2026-04-17 Original Meritocracy and Autocratic Power-Sharing: A Historical Perspective Clair Yang, Yasheng Huang, Zhaomin Li Abstract This paper proposes meritocracy as a power-sharing institution in authoritarian regimes, particularly in weakly institutionalized environments. Contrary to what Enlightenment scholars believed, our evidence shows that meritocratic institutions were not uncommon in historical states and were often associated with absolute rulers. Using a formal model, we demonstrate that meritocracy benefits rulers by enabling them to co-opt high-ability agents, and it can remain credible even without third-party enforcement mechanisms. Unlike other power-sharing institutions, such as parliaments, which function more effectively under weaker rulers, meritocracy is more likely to emerge endogenously under strong rulers and remains self-reinforcing over time. We test these theoretical predictions using historical case studies and empirical analysis of a panel of 289 historical polities. The results confirm a positive association between meritocracy and autocracy. We believe that meritocracy can fill the gap in the literature to explain power-sharing in many historical absolute regimes.