Populism

GOV 39/3 2026-07-10 Original Institutional Backsliding Under Liberal Democratic Backsliding: Central Bank Independence Reversal in Türkiye Caner Bakir Abstract ABSTRACT Despite the importance of research strands in identifying the micro‐mechanisms underpinning illiberal governance and democratic backsliding under populist or patrimonial rule in both liberal and illiberal democracies, the implications of populist‐patrimonial interventions by strong political leaders aiming for institutional backsliding have not been studied in detail. Drawing on a within‐case temporal comparison of erosion of central bank independence in Turkiye under the prolonged rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, this article focuses on the backsliding of legal‐rational institutional logic (e.g., loyalty to legal and professional rules and practices such as impersonality, neutrality, professionalism, and meritocracy) that informs political leader and bureaucrat interactions and their replacement with patrimonial institutional logic (e.g., absolute personal loyalty to a leader). It argues that the disruptive (defensive) institutional work of populist‐patrimonial strongman (insiders) is most likely to be effective in achieving institutional backsliding (maintenance) in public administration when the political regime structure, its main institutions, and agential‐level factors motivate and empower his prolonged, consistent, and persistent disruptive (defensive) institutional work.

GOV 39/3 2026-07-02 Original Regulatory Governance in the Era of Populist Ascendancy: A Tug‐of‐War Between Independent Public Authorities and Central Government in Greece

PMR — pp. 1-28 2026-06-11 Original Did populist governance change corruption risks during crises across European countries? Giuliana Ioannidis Abstract This study examines whether populist governance shaped public procurement corruption risks during COVID-19 across 23 EU Member States. Despite common emergency rules, corruption risks varied markedly. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the Corruption Risk Index, the study finds that populist governance combined with poor integrity norms is sufficient to explain high corruption risk increases. Populist-led governments intensify risks by undermining oversight, exploiting legal loopholes, and legitimizing rule-breaking through anti-elite narratives, particularly where accountability cultures are weak. Anti-corruption strategies must therefore account for crisis conditions and politicized governance, ensuring independent oversight mechanisms remain intact under populist rule.

GOV 39/2 2026-04-07 Original When the Regulatory State Meets Populism: Regulatory Agencies in Mexico Mauricio I. Dussauge‐Laguna, Martin Lodge, Daniel Daza‐Vázquez