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Policy Implementation

Coordination Costs and Homelessness Housing Form Choice

PAR — 2026-08-28 Original Coordination Costs and Homelessness Housing Form Choice Edmund Poku Adu, Julius A. Nukpezah Abstract ABSTRACT Local implementers have discretion in selecting forms of housing for the homeless, yet the determinants of these choices remain poorly understood. Using the institutional collective action (ICA) framework, this study examines California's Homekey program to assess how coordination demands shape decisions among hotel conversions, multifamily acquisitions, and modular or new construction. Drawing on binary logistic, generalized estimating equation (GEE), and multinomial logistic models, we find that larger projects and those designated as permanent housing are significantly more likely to pursue hotel conversions. Housing authorities—owing to their specialized missions and lower form‐specific coordination costs—are over six times more likely than cities to select multifamily acquisition. Local vacancy constraints further steer implementers away from modular or new construction and toward hotel conversions. These results demonstrate that implementation form is not a neutral technical decision but an institutional response to coordination challenges embedded in intergovernmental and interorganizational contexts.

Beyond monolithic state logic: how top-down accountability shapes policy implementation

PMR — pp. 1-30 2026-08-26 Original Beyond monolithic state logic: how top-down accountability shapes policy implementation W. G. Will Zhao Abstract How does top-down accountability shape policy implementation? Drawing on institutional logics, this paper distinguishes two state sub-logics: ‘high-stakes context logic’ emphasizing centralized control during crises, and ‘routine governance logic’ allowing discretion during day-to-day administration. These sub-logics condition the perceived legitimacy of accountability demands, felt accountability, and behavioural responses. A survey experiment with over 800 public service respondents shows that, under high-stakes logic, intensified accountability progressively improve compliance, whereas under routine logic, moderate accountability produces optimal compliance, with high-intensity accountability yielding diminishing returns. These findings challenge binary views of accountability and reveal how within-logic variations may alter governance mechanisms.

When Bureaucrats Deviate: Mission Motivation, Autonomy, and Policy Implementation in Thai District Governance

GOV 39/3 2026-06-02 Original When Bureaucrats Deviate: Mission Motivation, Autonomy, and Policy Implementation in Thai District Governance Dan Honig, Eleanor F. Woodhouse Abstract ABSTRACT Drawing on interviews and survey data from street‐level bureaucrats (SLBs) in eight Thai districts, we examine how mission motivation and autonomy combine to shape key SLB behaviors: policy compliance, policy customization, self‐directed action, and pro‐social rule‐breaking. We focus on how SLBs navigate the tension between delivering “up” to Bangkok and delivering “down” to citizens when they perceive these demands to be in conflict. We find substantial variation in how bureaucrats respond to this dilemma, which is potentially mediated by their professional environment (peer and leader interactions) and individual traits (such as rebelliousness and creativity). Leveraging Thailand's unusual combination of high mission motivation and de facto decentralized discretion within a formally centralized system, we show how autonomy can create the space for bureaucrats to prioritize local welfare over strict compliance. In doing so, we highlight the psychological and organizational mechanisms that link mission motivation to SLB behavior and illuminate how de facto decentralization shapes the public administration citizens experience.

Filtered Policy Implementation: Evidence from Rural China

JCC — pp. 1-17 2026-06-02 Original Filtered Policy Implementation: Evidence from Rural China Suyuan He, Weiye Wang Abstract Through tracing incidents of agricultural product looting, this paper reveals the political logic behind local governments’ paradoxical behavior of promoting farmland scaling-up while marginalizing smallholders under the potential political threat of deviating from central directives. This dilemma stems from the evolution of bureaucratic evaluation arrangements and broader societal changes. Under increasing pressure on target assessments and supervision, local governments resort to measures including exploiting smallholders’ welfare to fulfil compulsory agricultural production targets, despite the fact that both production and welfare are two-fold of the integral goal of the state’s strategy. These practices have led to the collapse of traditional agricultural communities and heightened conflicts between local residents and nonlocal large-scale producers, reshaping grassroots agrarian production patterns profoundly and irreversibly.

Serving the public or checking boxes? Exploring motivations for overcompliance in policy implementation

PMR — pp. 1-34 2026-04-05 Original Serving the public or checking boxes? Exploring motivations for overcompliance in policy implementation Xue Gao, Quanfeng Shu, Hongtao Yi Abstract Policy implementation research has examined why street-level bureaucrats do not comply with higher-level directives; however, it has paid far less attention to why they overcomply and what this means for policy outcomes. This study addresses this gap by theorizing two competing drivers of overcompliance and analysing China’s national Solar Photovoltaic for Poverty Alleviation Program. We find that formalism is positively associated with overcompliance, while the effect of public-interest commitment is conditional on formalism. The results advance research on policy implementation and public service motivation by showing how intrinsic motivation and organizational norms interact to shape overcompliance and influence policy outcomes.

Do Elites Know Best? Candidate Selection and Policy Implementation in Postindependence Tanzania

APSR — pp. 1-22 2026-03-23 Original Do Elites Know Best? Candidate Selection and Policy Implementation in Postindependence Tanzania JEREMY BOWLES Abstract How do candidate selection processes shape policy outcomes? Studying Tanzania’s initial single-party legislative elections, I assess how electing candidates preferred by party elites affected policy implementation, which emphasized rural development during this period. Leveraging the deterministic assignment of ballot symbols—which was orthogonal to candidate characteristics but had large electoral effects—finds that their election substantially increased the supply of salient local public goods. Assembling novel candidate-level data, I document that elites prioritized candidates’ national prominence while voters prioritized their local ties. Rather than representing misaligned incentives, the results are consistent with elites, in an incipient regime, more quickly understanding which characteristics would matter for candidates’ performance in office. Beyond highlighting novel conditions under which elite-led candidate selection facilitates responsiveness, the results underscore the distributive consequences of candidate selection even in nondemocratic settings.

The contested nature of New Public Governance as a third governance model

PMR — pp. 1-27 2026-03-22 Original The contested nature of New Public Governance as a third governance model Nicolette van Gestel, Ewan Ferlie Abstract This article examines New Public Governance (NPG), emphasizing the underexposed role of the national state. Focusing on Dutch labour market policy, it draws on document analysis and (group) interviews with 74 public and private stakeholders across national and subnational levels. While NPG principles are evident in network composition and collaboration, interaction between policymaking and implementation remains limited, indicating weak NPG diffusion. A longitudinal analysis over more than a decade, reveals structural barriers to interactive decision-making and performance enhancement. The findings point to a multifaceted form of state steering that generates divergent institutional arrangements and shifting power dynamics, with significant implications for governance and policymaking processes.