Polarization

AJPS — 2026-07-19 Original Contesting repression in divided democracies: Can counternarratives reduce support for police violence? Yanilda María González, Natán Skigin

JOP — 2026-07-17 Original Open-Ended Survey Responses and Political Conceptualizations in a Polarized Era Maxwell Allamong, Benjamin Beutel, Jongwoo Jeong, Paul Kellstedt Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 极化时代的开放式调查回答与政治概念化

JOP — 2026-07-17 Original Media, Electoral Accountability, and Partisan Polarization Daniel J. Moskowitz Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 媒体、选举问责与党派极化 Daniel J. Moskowitz 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 媒体、选举问责、党派极化、政治极化、选民行为、政党认同 DOI: 10.1086/743211 查看原文 →

PSJ — 2026-05-27 Original Polarization Entrepreneurs: Dividing to Conquer in the Trump Era Christoph H. Stefes, Kayla M. Gabehart, Kristin Olofsson Abstract ABSTRACT The policy process literature has long theorized about the role of policy entrepreneurs, whom Paul Cairney calls the “hero... who knows that the pursuit of ambitious aims such as ‘evidence‐based policymaking’ requires framing a problem, having a solution ready, and exploiting the motive and opportunity of policymakers to select it” (2018, 199). The research agenda on policy entrepreneurs also holds great potential for another type of policy actor that we aim to introduce into the policy process lexicon: the polarization entrepreneur. These polarization entrepreneurs aim not to resolve the specific policy conflict at hand, but to advance broader strategic goals, such as solidifying their ideological base, expanding their influence across several policy subsystems, or gaining electoral advantage. We introduce the polarization entrepreneur as a policy actor who strategizes within policy spaces in ways we have not yet fully comprehended or theorized. We thus draw on the Multiple Streams Literature (MSF), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) literature, as well as the political rise of Donald Trump to theorize about how these polarization entrepreneurs operate. We suggest a research agenda that presents a wealth of opportunity for policy scholars to better understand the policy system of our day.

PAR 86/5 pp. 1225-1234 2026-05-19 Original How Was Democracy Under the Administrative Presidency Supposed to Work? Ben Merriman Abstract ABSTRACT Aggressive use of the administrative power of the presidency is a major source of public administrative concern about the health of American democracy. Many of these powers stem from executive branch reorganization in the late 1930s, which was conceived and implemented by founding figures in the modern field. Fear for democracy defined reorganization. Reorganizers elaborated a working theory about the conditions under which strong presidential administration could preserve and strengthen democracy: structured internal friction in the executive branch to recreate traditional checks on administrative conduct; identification and promotion of a corps of socially and politically astute administrators; and a watchful Congress. This design relied on a political approach to administration that created few managerial or legal safeguards. As subsequent polarization has altered the political order under which executive reorganization was conceived, the institutional powers of the presidency have emerged as a threat to democratic arrangements, rather than a bulwark.

APSR — pp. 1-24 2026-05-14 Original Attitudes Toward Electoral System Reform and Party System Change in the U.S. QUINTON MAYNE, SHANE P. SINGH Abstract Electoral reform efforts in the United States are widespread, yet little is known about how Americans evaluate alternative electoral systems or their consequences. We address this gap using conjoint and vignette experiments to study how Americans assess electoral reforms based on their implications for the number of parties and the degree of ideological polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives. Focusing on democratic voice, governability, and responsiveness, our designs emphasize party-system outcomes rather than technical institutional features that may be difficult for citizens to understand. We find that Americans are strongly averse to reforms that generate pronounced legislative polarization, even when it might be expected to enhance democratic voice. Findings pertaining to multipartism are more mixed, with some evidence that respondents respond positively to moderate departures from the two-party system. Perceived gains in voice and responsiveness do not generally compensate for losses in governability, except under arrangements that avoid polarization.

AJPS — 2026-04-07 Original Veto players and policy development Alexander V. Hirsch, Kenneth W. Shotts Abstract Abstract We analyze the effects of veto players when the set of available policies is not exogenously fixed, but rather determined by policy developers who work to craft new high‐quality proposals. If veto players are moderate, there is active competition between developers on both sides of the ideological spectrum. However, more extreme veto players induce asymmetric activity, as one side disengages from development. With highly extreme veto players, policy development ceases, and gridlock results. We also analyze effects on centrists' utility. Moderate veto players dampen productive policy development, and extreme ones eliminate it entirely, either of which is bad for centrists. But some effects are surprisingly positive; somewhat extreme veto players can induce policy developers who dislike the status quo to craft moderate, high‐quality proposals. Our model accounts for changing patterns of policymaking in the U.S. Senate and suggests that if polarization continues centrists will become increasingly inclined to eliminate the filibuster.