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Party Leadership

Legalising State Capitalism: Reconfiguring SOE Governance in China

JCC — pp. 1-23 2026-10-08 Original Legalising State Capitalism: Reconfiguring SOE Governance in China Tianqi Gu Abstract How should China’s contemporary State-owned enterprise (SOE) governance reforms be understood: as the politicisation of corporate governance, or as a deeper transformation in State Capitalism? This article addresses this question by shifting attention from policy discourse to the emerging legislative architecture of SOE governance under Xi Jinping. Drawing on doctrinal analysis and case studies of reform implementation, it shows that recent reforms have restructured external governance through delegated State-owned capital management and ownership-mediated governance centred on State-owned Capital Investment and Operation Companies, while recasting internal governance through a dual legislative track combining Company Law and Party rules. It argues that these developments constitute the legal construction of a hybrid governance order in which Party leadership and corporate governance are institutionally differentiated yet coordinated.

The Political Economy of Local Government Debt Expansion in China

JCC — pp. 1-18 2026-04-05 Original The Political Economy of Local Government Debt Expansion in China Pan Liu, Jie Mao, Min Dai Abstract Since the 1990s, China has strengthened the Communist Party of China’s leadership over local People’s Congresses through a dual-appointment system, under which Party secretaries also serve as chairpersons of People’s Congresses. This article argues that this system enhances Party influence over legislative decision-making while further reducing institutional constraints, enabling local Party secretaries to pursue career-oriented agendas such as borrowing for infrastructure to boost economic growth. Under a growth-first development paradigm, this arrangement has fueled the rapid expansion of local government debt. Overall, these findings offer a political economy explanation for the dynamics of local government debt in China, and underscore the importance of stronger legal and institutional constraints on the dual-appointment system to mitigate local fiscal risks.