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Partisanship

Value misalignment in X’s feed algorithm is a reflection of value tensions in engagement

PNAS 123/34 pp. e2610388123-e2610388123 2026-08-17 Original Value misalignment in X’s feed algorithm is a reflection of value tensions in engagement Ziv Epstein, Farnaz Jahanbakhsh, Tiziano Piccardi, Axel Peytavin, Isabel Gallegos, Shardul Sapkota, Dora Zhao, Johan Ugander, Michael S. Bernstein

Media, Electoral Accountability, and Partisan Polarization

JOP — 2026-07-17 Original Media, Electoral Accountability, and Partisan Polarization Daniel J. Moskowitz Abstract (原文未提供摘要) 中文 媒体、选举问责与党派极化 Daniel J. Moskowitz 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 媒体、选举问责、党派极化、政治极化、选民行为、政党认同 DOI: 10.1086/743211 查看原文 →

Selection Method, Partisanship, and Performance of Government Oversight Functions

PAR — 2026-06-19 Original Selection Method, Partisanship, and Performance of Government Oversight Functions Lang (Kate) Yang Abstract ABSTRACT This study examines how the selection of public sector leaders affects organizational outcomes, especially in oversight functions where independence is expected. Political economy literature suggests that elected leaders better respond to voter preferences, while appointed leaders possess more expertise. Drawing on public administration theories of political control of the bureaucracy, we posit that, regardless of the selection method, public sector leaders as agents are subject to the influence of political principals with authority over the selection process. When the principal's interest is not aligned with the public interest, as seen in government oversight functions, its influence could compromise the performance of the selected leaders. Focusing on state auditors, the study finds that on average, selection methods are not correlated with audit findings, but an auditor whose political principal shares the same party affiliation as the auditee (the state governor) is less likely to identify financial management deficiencies.

Partisanship, Deservingness, and the Attitudinal Policy Feedback Process for Social Policy

PSJ — 2026-04-26 Original Partisanship, Deservingness, and the Attitudinal Policy Feedback Process for Social Policy Chris Faricy, Christopher Ellis Abstract ABSTRACT In an era of identity‐based partisan polarization, we examine whether social policies can still generate positive attitudinal feedback among beneficiaries. Drawing on nationally representative survey data, we demonstrate that partisanship conditions the policy feedback process through divergent perceptions of group deservingness. Democrats attribute economic vulnerability to systemic injustice and view policy beneficiaries as hardworking and sympathetic, while Republicans attribute poverty to individual failings and view beneficiaries more negatively. We show that Democrats evaluate both policy beneficiaries and taxpayers favorably, whereas Republicans sharply differentiate between these groups, viewing themselves as “makers” contributing to a system that benefits undeserving “takers.” These differences shape emotional responses to program use with Democrats reporting positive feelings about using social policies, while Republicans express more negative emotions. Even after controlling for actual policy usage and demographics, partisan gaps in attitudes toward social programs persist across diverse policy types. Experimental evidence reveals that partisan framing affects non‐users more than beneficiaries, with Democrats more responsive to group‐based cues. Our findings suggest that in American politics, partisan identities serve as powerful interpretive filters that prevent similar policy experiences from generating widespread positive political attitudes, thereby challenging the assumption that policies create new politics.