Organized Crime

PNAS 123/33 pp. e2512080123-e2512080123 2026-08-10 Original The money laundering market: An economic analysis Joras Ferwerda Abstract Criminals launder their proceeds from crime, either themselves or by paying a professional, to disguise the link between the criminal, the crime, and the proceeds. This allows the criminal to spend the proceeds more freely and lowers the chance of receiving unwanted attention from the authorities. This paper investigates the structure and dynamics of the understudied market for money laundering services. The analysis reveals that this illegal market is demand-driven and fragmented, with different forms of laundering, each requiring different steps with varying levels of risk. High search costs, specialized money launderers, and uncertainties lead to local monopolies. Demand tends to be relatively inelastic because criminals eventually need laundering services to spend their proceeds. Local monopolies, inelastic demand, and poor information flows lead to relatively high prices for laundering. Trust issues and two-sided asymmetric information lead to a market with relationships that tend to last longer than generally expected in illegal markets.

WP 78/2 pp. 251-292 2026-04-01 Original Making or Breaking Citizens? Criminal Organizations and State-Society Relations Kaitlyn Chriswell Abstract abstract: When do groups of citizens organize to resist criminal group presence, and what form does their resistance take? Criminal groups operate across the globe, imposing a variety of costs on local communities. Confronted with these conditions, citizens can either accommodate or contest; when they contest, they choose either to engage or to avoid the state. This article leverages variation in three municipalities across Mexico to illustrate how and why communities react differently to the presence of criminal organizations. While the degree of criminal competition and the strength of preexisting civil society drive whether groups of citizens contest, the degree of local state autonomy from criminal groups shapes the form—state centered or nonstate—that contestation takes. Organized crime is broadly considered an impediment to functioning democracy, but this article demonstrates that its presence can also push citizens in some cases to organize and engage with the state in ways that bolster democracy.

JOP 88/2 pp. 465-478 2026-04-01 Original Commodity Booms, Conflict, and Organized Crime: Logics of Violence in Indonesia’s Oil Palm Plantation Economy