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Municipalities

Decentralization as an anticorruption strategy: does revenue autonomy make a difference?

PMR — pp. 1-32 2026-10-07 Original Decentralization as an anticorruption strategy: does revenue autonomy make a difference? Fabio Monteduro, Riccardo Mussari Abstract This study investigates how revenue autonomy is associated with documented municipal corruption risk, distinguishing between own-source tax and non-tax revenues. Drawing on public administration theories of decentralization, it adopts a meso-level analysis of Italian medium-to-large municipalities and relies on an event-based indicator derived from legally mandated anticorruption reports. The empirical strategy combines dynamic correlated random-effects logit, dynamic random-effects probit, and fixed-effects logit models, complemented by sensitivity analyses simulating under-reporting scenarios. Results indicate that higher levels of both tax and non-tax revenue autonomy are negatively associated with documented corruption risk. Tax autonomy shows stronger associations where political competition is higher, whereas the non-tax revenue pattern is more consistent with a service-based responsiveness logic. These findings, observed in the Italian municipal context, suggest that revenue autonomy is not a uniform anticorruption safeguard but an institutional feature whose relevance depends on revenue composition, accountability conditions, municipal capacity, and reporting practices.