↓ 跳过正文

Local Governance

Bureaucratic Restructuring and the State-led (De-)Financialization of Local Governance in China

·747 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共行政 政治经济学 中国研究 China Local Governance Financialization Bureaucratic Restructuring Central-Local Relations
CQ 266 pp. 325-344 2026-06-04 Original Bureaucratic Restructuring and the State-led (De-)Financialization of Local Governance in China Xuchen Zhang, Fenghua Pan Abstract Abstract State-led financialization has emerged as a salient feature of local governance in China, yet it remains underexplored through the lens of bureaucratic restructuring. This paper traces the evolution of local financial agencies since 2002 through four distinct stages: local financial offices ( jinrongban ), financial bureaus ( jinrongju ), financial regulatory bureaus ( jinrong jianguanju ) and financial commissions ( jinrongwei ). Initially, local governments established jinrongban to harness financial capital for regional development. By proactively connecting local firms with capital markets to facilitate corporate listings, they embedded financial logic into local governance, reflecting local state-led financialization. Subsequently, the central government formalized these bodies into jinrongju with expanded mandates, deepening state-led financialization. Later, it systematically devolved regulatory responsibilities and renamed them jinrong jianguanju , elevating regulatory functions to a top priority, illustrating how the central government selectively steered the direction of financialization. Ultimately, provincial agencies were reorganized into jinrongwei and stripped of development functions, while city-level counterparts were largely closed, signifying a shift towards central state-led de-financialization. This trajectory was driven by shifting central–local dynamics, as early bottom-up initiatives were superseded by top-down control. The bureaucratic restructuring examined in this study offers new insights into the state-led (de-)financialization of local governance in China.

From Contention to Clientelism: Evidence from the Ten-Year Fishing Ban in China

·707 字·2 分钟
Polihot 比较政治 公共行政 中国研究 Clientelism Everyday Resistance Fishing Ban China Local Governance
CQ 266 pp. 385-399 2026-04-13 Original From Contention to Clientelism: Evidence from the Ten-Year Fishing Ban in China Jingping Liu Abstract Abstract How do ordinary Chinese people circumvent unpopular state policies? The existing literature primarily focuses on resistance against local bureaucrats. Drawing on ethnographic research on the ten-year fishing ban in the Yangtze River Basin, this article finds that fishermen (clients) continue to fish by maintaining patron–client relationships with the enforcers of the fishing ban (patrons). Ordinary fishermen seek the protection of enforcers through bribery. Enhanced state monitoring under the fishing ban facilitates bribery-based clientelism by weakening the fishermen’s everyday resistance, but it also constrains the power of enforcers by increasing the risk that their corruption will be discovered by upper-level authorities. For extremely poor fishermen, who are barely able to afford to pay bribes, their daily acts of resistance are morally justified by the need for subsistence safety, presenting enforcers with a dilemma: they must fulfil their law enforcement duties while also ensuring the survival of these individuals to maintain social stability. Therefore, cultivating a clientelist relationship with impoverished fishermen enables enforcers to manage their noncompliance, thereby balancing these conflicting goals. While clientelism protects people from unpopular policies to some extent, it more fundamentally strengthens the power of local bureaucrats, creating the potential for greater exploitation and larger-scale popular grievances in the long run.