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Lobbying

When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil

APSR — pp. 1-16 2026-10-30 Original When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil FERNANDO B. MELLO Abstract The influence of interest groups on policy making is a central concern in representative democracies, yet identifying causal effects remains a significant challenge. This article argues that legislators respond to informational cues about the economic importance and coalition breadth of interest groups. A field experiment in Brazil, which randomized the receipt of printed and WhatsApp messages from a pro-reform business organization, reveals that legislators are more likely to vote in favor of the group’s position when its membership size, economic importance, and sectoral reach are emphasized. A survey experiment with lobbyists supports this mechanism, showing that messages highlighting group characteristics increase legislators’ expected engagement and support. In-depth interviews with key political figures—including a former president, ministers, and deputies—further corroborate these findings. This study contributes to the literature on informational lobbying and cue-based persuasion by employing realistic experimental treatments and mixed-methods evidence.

Climate exposure drives firm political behavior: Evidence from earnings calls and lobbying data

AJPS — 2026-04-26 Original Climate exposure drives firm political behavior: Evidence from earnings calls and lobbying data Christian Baehr, Fiona Bare, Vincent Heddesheimer Abstract Abstract When and how do firms engage in climate politics? We argue that regulatory concerns, business opportunities, and physical risks activate policy preferences and lobbying efforts. We measure firm‐level exposure to opportunity, regulatory, and physical aspects of climate change based on discussion in quarterly earnings call transcripts for 11,705 publicly traded firms between 2001 and 2023. We estimate the effect of climate exposure on climate lobbying instances (extensive margin), amount (intensive margin), and targets (political entities). We find that more exposed companies, especially in terms of opportunities and regulation, are more likely to lobby. The type of climate exposure, both absolute and relative to industry peers, dictates whether firms lobby, how much they spend on lobbying, and their choice of government target. Taken together, our findings demonstrate the importance of disaggregating firm‐level perceptions of climate impacts to understand patterns in political activity.