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Legislative Behavior

When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil

APSR — pp. 1-16 2026-10-30 Original When Business Speaks, Legislators Listen: Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Brazil FERNANDO B. MELLO Abstract The influence of interest groups on policy making is a central concern in representative democracies, yet identifying causal effects remains a significant challenge. This article argues that legislators respond to informational cues about the economic importance and coalition breadth of interest groups. A field experiment in Brazil, which randomized the receipt of printed and WhatsApp messages from a pro-reform business organization, reveals that legislators are more likely to vote in favor of the group’s position when its membership size, economic importance, and sectoral reach are emphasized. A survey experiment with lobbyists supports this mechanism, showing that messages highlighting group characteristics increase legislators’ expected engagement and support. In-depth interviews with key political figures—including a former president, ministers, and deputies—further corroborate these findings. This study contributes to the literature on informational lobbying and cue-based persuasion by employing realistic experimental treatments and mixed-methods evidence.

A Model of Party Effects on Legislative Behavior Based on Roll Call Data

JOP 88/3 pp. 1098-1114 2026-07-01 Original A Model of Party Effects on Legislative Behavior Based on Roll Call Data Fang-Yi Chiou, Guillermo Rosas Abstract (原文未提供摘要) 中文 基于唱名表决数据的政党对立法行为影响的一个模型 Fang-Yi Chiou, Guillermo Rosas

Mutual restraint in nondemocratic legislatures

AJPS — 2026-03-25 Original Mutual restraint in nondemocratic legislatures Sarah Hummel Abstract Abstract Nondemocratic regimes sometimes benefit from tolerating the expression of critical opinions and visions for policy in their legislatures. Doing so enables them to gather important information about societal preferences, to co‐opt potential challengers, and to address other threats to their control. In these cases, regimes and deputies exhibit mutual restraint: deputies respect regime‐set limits on their freedom to express critical opinions, while regimes refrain from punishing deputies for expressing negative views when the stakes are acceptably low. By examining both the responsiveness of individual deputies and how regimes police the limits of acceptable behavior, we are better able to identify both the functions and strengths of nondemocratic legislatures. I illustrate these dynamics using data about deputy voting behavior and legislative success in the Kyrgyz Jogorku Kenesh (2016–2020).