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Legislative Behavior

A Model of Party Effects on Legislative Behavior Based on Roll Call Data

JOP 88/3 pp. 1098-1114 2026-07-01 Original A Model of Party Effects on Legislative Behavior Based on Roll Call Data Fang-Yi Chiou, Guillermo Rosas Abstract (原文未提供摘要) 中文 基于唱名表决数据的政党对立法行为影响的一个模型 Fang-Yi Chiou, Guillermo Rosas

Mutual restraint in nondemocratic legislatures

AJPS — 2026-03-25 Original Mutual restraint in nondemocratic legislatures Sarah Hummel Abstract Abstract Nondemocratic regimes sometimes benefit from tolerating the expression of critical opinions and visions for policy in their legislatures. Doing so enables them to gather important information about societal preferences, to co‐opt potential challengers, and to address other threats to their control. In these cases, regimes and deputies exhibit mutual restraint: deputies respect regime‐set limits on their freedom to express critical opinions, while regimes refrain from punishing deputies for expressing negative views when the stakes are acceptably low. By examining both the responsiveness of individual deputies and how regimes police the limits of acceptable behavior, we are better able to identify both the functions and strengths of nondemocratic legislatures. I illustrate these dynamics using data about deputy voting behavior and legislative success in the Kyrgyz Jogorku Kenesh (2016–2020).