WP 78/3 pp. 419-458 2026-07-01 Original Who Sets the Agenda? Diplomatic Experience and Small Power Influence in the United Nations
Sabrina B. Arias
Abstract
abstract: Why are some small powers effective in setting the UN agenda, even in the face of large power opposition? The author argues that small states are more likely to be represented by experienced diplomats, who, over time, accumulate influence that can be deployed to shape the international organization’s agenda. To test these claims, the author assembled a data set of proposed agenda items and the tenure of all states’ ambassadors from 1946 to 2018 and conducted interviews with diplomats from forty-nine states. The author finds that smaller powers have more diplomatic experience than larger powers; that individuals with more diplomatic experience are more successful at agenda setting even when accounting for material power; and that random shocks to ambassadorial tenure, such as the death of an ambassador, have negative effects on diplomatic experience and effectiveness. These insights contribute to understanding the role of individuals and diplomacy in international relations and the ways in which small powers influence international politics.
JOP 88/3 pp. 1231-1244 2026-07-01 Original Understanding Resourcing Trade-Offs in International Organizations: Evidence from an Elite Survey Experiment
Mirko Heinzel, Bernhard Reinsberg, Christian Siauwijaya
Abstract
International organizations (IOs) are mandated to address some of the most important global challenges under intense budget scarcity. In recent years, they expanded their funding base through a greater reliance on earmarked voluntary contributions by member states and nonstate actors. Critics warn that earmarked funding creates an important trade-off: IOs can do more with earmarked funding but have less control over what they do and do it less well. In this registered report, we probe how staff evaluate different types of earmarking through a novel elite survey experiment with staff from six United Nations organizations. We show that staff prefer earmarking for their own area of work over other types of earmarking. However, these preferences do not affect the funding amount they deem as appropriate or the overheads they expect their organization to charge. Our study provides important insights for debates on the resourcing of IOs and the motivations of international bureaucrats.
JOP 88/2 pp. 732-745 2026-04-01 Original Effects of Popular Legitimacy on International Organizations: An Elite Survey Experiment
Thomas Sommerer, Jonas Tallberg
Abstract
Whether or not popular legitimacy matters for international organizations (IOs) is a topic of extensive assumption but little rigorous research. A key obstacle has been the methodological difficulties of establishing legitimacy’s effect using observational data. This article offers the first experimental study of the effects of popular legitimacy on IOs. Theoretically, we propose that popular legitimacy affects IOs through the mechanism of government responsiveness to public opinion. Empirically, we test this expectation by presenting elected politicians in Sweden with a scenario of proposed reforms to the World Health Organization (WHO) and randomized information about the organization’s degree of popular legitimacy. The results show that higher levels of popular legitimacy made politicians more willing to confer additional authority and resources on the IO. The effects were particularly large among politicians with positive pretreatment attitudes toward the WHO and leftist ideological orientations. These findings suggest that popular legitimacy matters by affecting national decision-makers’ willingness to empower IOs.