India

GOV 39/4 2026-07-19 Original Breaking Out of Low‐Effort Traps: Bureaucratic Leadership by Persuasion Martin Haus

AJPS — 2026-07-02 Original Bureaucrat assignments as instruments of political control: Theory and evidence from land administration officials in India Anustubh Agnihotri, Aditya Dasgupta, Devesh Kapur

AJPS — 2026-06-27 Original Getting on the grid: A field experiment on bottom‐up political pressure and access to essential public services

JOP 88/2 pp. 509-525 2026-04-01 Original Social Density, Clientelism, and Community Benefits Jeremy Spater, Erik Wibbels Abstract How does the social structure of a neighborhood affect the linkage strategies chosen by politicians? Our argument links the social centrality of individuals and the social density of neighborhoods to the incidence of individual-level clientelism and the contingent provision of neighborhood benefits, respectively. We test the resulting hypotheses using a combination of original network, experimental and nonexperimental survey data collected across 9,184 households in 217 slums across three cities in India. We find that socially central individuals are more likely to be targeted with private clientelism and that more socially dense neighborhoods are more likely to coordinate votes, attract benefits, and achieve the legal prerequisites for public services.