APSR — pp. 1-20 2026-10-02 Original The Representation Trap: How Minority Power Shapes Electoral Politics in India
FEYAAD ALLIE
Abstract
Liberal democracy requires that minority groups be represented in politics. This article argues that minority representation can also generate headwinds for political inclusion by dividing the minority group and consolidating the dominant group. I study the combination of these processes, termed the representation trap, through a mixed-methods examination of Muslims in India. Analyses of election results and an original survey of Hindu and Muslim voters show that electing a Muslim representative divides Muslim votes across an increased share of coethnic candidates and consolidates Hindu votes for the majoritarian party in the subsequent election. Qualitative evidence and a vignette experiment trace these patterns to two mechanisms: sub-identity activation among Muslims and super-ordinate identity mobilization among Hindus. By showing how representation restructures elite and voter behavior within both minority and dominant groups, the article highlights the dynamic nature of ethnic politics and complicates the view of minorities as politically unified.
JOP 88/4 pp. 1483-1495 2026-10-01 Original Left Behind or Left Ahead? Implications of Male Migration on Female Political Engagement
Rithika Kumar
Abstract
How does the temporary absence of men from the household due to migration affect female political engagement? While studies on gender and politics have established the centrality of the household, they have largely overlooked how temporary changes in household composition shape political engagement. Using original data from a survey experiment (n=642) in Bihar, India, I show that the absence of male members, particularly a woman's husband can lift implicit restrictions on female political engagement. Drawing on a primary survey (n=1900), and a nationally representative panel (n=24000), I argue that male migration, a significant global phenomenon resulting in routine absence of men, is leading to the feminization of political engagement. Through an increase in exposure to the public sphere, women make meaningful claims on the state, participate in civic activities, and discuss politics. Unlike existing resource-based theories, I find that female political engagement can increase even in the absence of financial autonomy.
JOP 88/4 pp. 1588-1602 2026-10-01 Original Demanding Violence, Punishing Peace: Support for Party Violence in India
Ursula Daxecker, Neeraj Prasad
Abstract
Some studies show that voters punish parties for violence, while others find that violence can benefit politicians. We argue that core and swing voters support rather than punish violence by co-partisans under some conditions. Parties aim to benefit from violence by portraying it as a response to a threat, provocation, or injustice by an out-group or rival party. Once legitimized by politicians, voters support violence by co-partisans and punish them for peaceful responses. We test our argument with preregistered vignette experiments in a representative survey during the 2022 elections in Uttar Pradesh, India. Our findings support expectations; respondents are more likely to support violence and approve of parties involved in it when it is legitimized. These effects are driven by Hindus as the majority group, in particular core supporters of the incumbent party. Our study establishes the micro-foundations of support for violence in democracies.
GOV 39/4 2026-07-19
Original Breaking Out of Low‐Effort Traps: Bureaucratic Leadership by Persuasion
Martin Haus
AJPS — 2026-07-02
Original Bureaucrat assignments as instruments of political control: Theory and evidence from land administration officials in India
Anustubh Agnihotri, Aditya Dasgupta, Devesh Kapur
AJPS — 2026-06-27
Original Getting on the grid: A field experiment on bottom‐up political pressure and access to essential public services
JOP 88/2 pp. 509-525 2026-04-01 Original Social Density, Clientelism, and Community Benefits
Jeremy Spater, Erik Wibbels
Abstract
How does the social structure of a neighborhood affect the linkage strategies chosen by politicians? Our argument links the social centrality of individuals and the social density of neighborhoods to the incidence of individual-level clientelism and the contingent provision of neighborhood benefits, respectively. We test the resulting hypotheses using a combination of original network, experimental and nonexperimental survey data collected across 9,184 households in 217 slums across three cities in India. We find that socially central individuals are more likely to be targeted with private clientelism and that more socially dense neighborhoods are more likely to coordinate votes, attract benefits, and achieve the legal prerequisites for public services.