AJPS — 2026-08-20
Original A theory of political divergence and gradual institutional change
Clair Yang
Abstract
Abstract Why do some societies succeed in breaking away from historical traditions while others remain trapped? This paper proposes a formal theory to investigate the interaction between short‐run and long‐run political dynamics, highlighting a co‐evolution of political institutions and social structures. A society consists of various social groups, such as the rulers, the elites, and the commoners. Short‐run strategic considerations give rise to different coalitions among these groups, which determine not only political regimes but also redistribution policies. In the long run, these policies shape the accumulation of wealth and power, where small initial differences can lead to divergent paths of development. Finally, the paper examines three historical case studies on medieval Europe, imperial China, and the medieval Muslim world to illustrate potential pathways of long‐run political development.
APSR — pp. 1-12 2026-07-29 Original Is Blood Thicker Than Water(-and-Earth)? Partisanship Geography in Imperial China and the Limits of Quantitative History
YAO LIN
Abstract
Using Wang Anshi’s Reform as a case study, Yuhua Wang’s “Blood is Thicker Than Water” ( American Political Science Review , 2022) argues that geographically dispersed kinship networks incentivize political elites to support the building of a strong state, whereas geographically concentrated kinship networks undermine state building. In this article, I improve the sample with the help of additional historical records and show that the reported correlation fails to replicate when either the control issue or the outlier issue is considered. I then propose two alternative hypotheses on the role of kinship network dispersal in Wang Anshi’s Reform, based on two common explanations of its partisanship geography in Chinese historical scholarship, that is, status competition and policy adaptiveness. After examining those hypotheses respectively, I reflect on the limits of quantitative history that this case illustrates.
JOP — 2026-04-17
Original Meritocracy and Autocratic Power-Sharing: A Historical Perspective
Clair Yang, Yasheng Huang, Zhaomin Li
Abstract
This paper proposes meritocracy as a power-sharing institution in authoritarian regimes, particularly in weakly institutionalized environments. Contrary to what Enlightenment scholars believed, our evidence shows that meritocratic institutions were not uncommon in historical states and were often associated with absolute rulers. Using a formal model, we demonstrate that meritocracy benefits rulers by enabling them to co-opt high-ability agents, and it can remain credible even without third-party enforcement mechanisms. Unlike other power-sharing institutions, such as parliaments, which function more effectively under weaker rulers, meritocracy is more likely to emerge endogenously under strong rulers and remains self-reinforcing over time. We test these theoretical predictions using historical case studies and empirical analysis of a panel of 289 historical polities. The results confirm a positive association between meritocracy and autocracy. We believe that meritocracy can fill the gap in the literature to explain power-sharing in many historical absolute regimes.
AJPS — 2026-03-19
Original Rulers on the road: Itinerant rule in the Holy Roman Empire, AD 919–1519