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Government Responsiveness

Unpacking local government responsiveness to social media: evidence from Mexico

PMR — pp. 1-28 2026-09-17 Original Unpacking local government responsiveness to social media: evidence from Mexico Guillermo M. Cejudo, Fernando Nieto-Morales Abstract Local governments worldwide increasingly adopt social media to engage citizens. What factors make governments more likely to respond to citizens on social media? We explore how Mexican municipal governments use Facebook to interact with citizens, with a mixed-methods approach analysing data from 635 municipalities. Using a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis, we distinguish between general responsiveness (channel setup) and interactive responsiveness (substantive engagement). Small municipalities are more likely to engage citizens when adaptive potential and formal participation policies are present. In contrast, larger cities show responsiveness when they have available resources, established participation rules and policies, and a propitious environment.

Rising Engagement and Substantive Responsiveness: 13 Years of Online Petitioning in China

CQ — pp. 1-17 2026-08-05 Original Rising Engagement and Substantive Responsiveness: 13 Years of Online Petitioning in China Matt DeButts, Tongtong Zhang Abstract Abstract The Chinese government has invested heavily in online petition platforms to channel public grievances, yet systematic longitudinal evidence on citizen–state interactions within these venues remains limited. This research report presents nationwide evidence showing that both public participation and government responsiveness through e-petition institutions have increased markedly since Xi Jinping took office. Analysing more than four million citizen appeals submitted to the country’s largest online petition portal, Message Board for Leaders, from January 2011 to January 2024, we find a twelvefold rise in petition volume and a fivefold increase in users, largely driven by urban residents in eastern provinces. Appeals have also diversified, with notable growth in housing-related issues and more strategic appeals directed at Party secretaries. Meanwhile, local governments have raised response rates from 50 per cent to 98 per cent, shortened average wait times from 176 to 19 days, and increased the substantive resolution rate from 17 per cent to 31 per cent over the past decade.

When the Mass Line Encounters the Ground: Public-Oriented Accountability and Frontline Coping in China

JCC — pp. 1-17 2026-07-24 Original When the Mass Line Encounters the Ground: Public-Oriented Accountability and Frontline Coping in China Huan He Abstract While the consolidation of state control in China is well-documented, less attention has been given to the reinforcement of public-oriented accountability, which emphasizes citizen satisfaction with complaint resolution in government performance assessments. Drawing on statistical data and fieldwork interviews, this study finds that while public-oriented accountability can partially promote substantive government responsiveness by imposing institutional pressure on frontline officials, it also fosters a public perception of an omnipotent government and exacerbates the predicament of grassroots incapacity. This not only traps frontline bureaucrats in administrative burden caused by blame-avoidance strategies, but may also fuel frustration among mobilized citizens with heightened expectations. The findings reveal the institutional sources and constraints of government responsiveness and highlight the potential challenges of operationalizing the mass line to consolidate legitimacy.

Effects of Popular Legitimacy on International Organizations: An Elite Survey Experiment

JOP 88/2 pp. 732-745 2026-04-01 Original Effects of Popular Legitimacy on International Organizations: An Elite Survey Experiment Thomas Sommerer, Jonas Tallberg Abstract Whether or not popular legitimacy matters for international organizations (IOs) is a topic of extensive assumption but little rigorous research. A key obstacle has been the methodological difficulties of establishing legitimacy’s effect using observational data. This article offers the first experimental study of the effects of popular legitimacy on IOs. Theoretically, we propose that popular legitimacy affects IOs through the mechanism of government responsiveness to public opinion. Empirically, we test this expectation by presenting elected politicians in Sweden with a scenario of proposed reforms to the World Health Organization (WHO) and randomized information about the organization’s degree of popular legitimacy. The results show that higher levels of popular legitimacy made politicians more willing to confer additional authority and resources on the IO. The effects were particularly large among politicians with positive pretreatment attitudes toward the WHO and leftist ideological orientations. These findings suggest that popular legitimacy matters by affecting national decision-makers’ willingness to empower IOs.

Bureaucratic Incentives and Government Responsiveness in China

GOV 39/2 2026-03-02 Original Bureaucratic Incentives and Government Responsiveness in China Haemin Jee Abstract ABSTRACT Citizen complaints have long been considered an important channel of communication between citizens and officials in authoritarian regimes. Existing explanations for responsiveness to citizen complaints in China, however, do not adequately consider the role of local bureaucratic incentives as a driver of responsiveness. This paper seeks to explain local government responsiveness to citizen demands through this lens. Original data of citizen complaints and government responses from a Chinese prefecture and its subordinate counties demonstrate that lower level officials are more likely to respond to citizen complaints when monitored by their superiors. On the other hand, they are less responsive on unmonitored forums. Thus, oversight by higher level officials may be important in increasing actual government responsiveness; citizen complaints alone may not be enough to spur government action. While recent studies emphasize authoritarian accountability arising through quasi‐democratic institutions, this paper suggests incentives of local political actors may condition the effectiveness of these institutions.