Formal Theory

AJPS — 2026-08-20 Original A theory of political divergence and gradual institutional change Clair Yang Abstract Abstract Why do some societies succeed in breaking away from historical traditions while others remain trapped? This paper proposes a formal theory to investigate the interaction between short‐run and long‐run political dynamics, highlighting a co‐evolution of political institutions and social structures. A society consists of various social groups, such as the rulers, the elites, and the commoners. Short‐run strategic considerations give rise to different coalitions among these groups, which determine not only political regimes but also redistribution policies. In the long run, these policies shape the accumulation of wealth and power, where small initial differences can lead to divergent paths of development. Finally, the paper examines three historical case studies on medieval Europe, imperial China, and the medieval Muslim world to illustrate potential pathways of long‐run political development.

AJPS — 2026-07-19 Original Electoral contests over voter beliefs Dan Alexander, Alexander Evert Abstract Abstract Voter perceptions of candidates are the substrate on which campaigns act. It is costly, however, for voters to devote enough attention to politics to change their own perceptions of candidates. This paper views campaigns—and the time, effort, and money they expend—as subsidizing rationally inattentive voters' adoption of new beliefs about candidate platforms. We employ an all‐pay contest to model costly competition over voter perceptions. In our baseline model, campaigns seek to improve perceptions of their own candidates. In a variant, candidates engage in negative campaigning. Among other results, we observe platform divergence under more reasonable informational assumptions than previous spatial models, replacing candidate uncertainty about voters with voter uncertainty about candidates. This model serves as a bridge between behavioral research on campaigns and theoretical literature on elections, offering a richer set of empirical predictions while preserving the insights of the canonical Downsian framework as a limiting case.

JOP — 2026-07-15 Original Strategic Legislation under Weakened Judicial Review Michael Beenstock Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 司法审查弱化下的策略性立法 Michael Beenstock 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 司法审查、策略性立法、立法行为、司法政治、权力分立、立法机关 DOI: 10.1086/743114 查看原文 →

JOP 88/3 pp. 1202-1215 2026-07-01 Original Soft Power as Constituency Cultivation Scott A. Tyson, Ethan Kapstein, Audrye Wong Abstract How do foreign agents, representing countries or other political actors, exert influence in another country? While scholars have directed considerable theoretical and empirical attention toward “hard power” (e.g., coercion [explicit or implicit] and corruption/bribery), far less consideration has been devoted to understanding the theoretical mechanisms associated with “soft” channels of political influence. We develop a novel theory of soft power as constituency cultivation whereby an actor (government or firm) makes a targeted investment in a foreign society with the objective of creating greater policy alignment among a set of politically relevant actors (the policy selectorate). We consider two factors that influence constituency cultivation, preexisting interest congruence and coordination (e.g., focal points), and extend our model to include corruption and other forms of bribery. We show how the potential for corruption/bribery can enhance the benefits from soft power, implying that corruption and soft power are complementary forms of influence.