AJPS — 2026-10-25
Original The threat‐enhancing effect of authoritarian power sharing
AJPS — 2026-10-23
Original Learning traps
Hassan Sayed
Abstract
Abstract When constituents are uncertain about whether leaders' policy preferences align with their interests, policy choices generate a trade‐off between payoffs and information. Leaders can experiment with their preferred policy, but if the outcome is bad, constituents learn this and threaten office removal. I use a repeated model of political agency to analyze how this trade‐off shapes long‐lived, term‐unlimited leaders' policy choices. When there is uncertainty about the optimal policy for constituents, leaders implement “learning traps”: spatially intermediate policies that halt learning about what the best policy is. They experiment only when their preferences are very likely to be aligned with constituents, a contrast to the “gambling for resurrection” logic ubiquitous in the literature. I provide a case study that examines how the 1861 reforms ending Serfdom in Imperial Russia represented the logic of a “learning trap” and illustrate additional applications of the model to political contagion and economic policymaking.
APSR — pp. 1-19 2026-09-29 Original Democratic Accountability with Citizen Coproduction
JIE MA, KEITH E. SCHNAKENBERG, IAN R. TURNER
Abstract
Many policies require citizens to actively participate in their implementation in order to be successful, a situation referred to as citizen coproduction. Though citizen coproduction is necessary in many policy areas, it could create difficulties for democratic accountability because citizens and politicians share responsibility for policy failures and attribution of blame may be difficult. We analyze the problem of democratic accountability with citizen coproduction in the context of a model in which politicians, who vary with respect to their competence at selecting policies, choose whether to implement policies whose success depends on citizen coproduction choices. For citizens, the problem is one of attribution: when coproduction is low, it may be hard to select good incumbents because policy failures are frequent even when policy choices are good. Incumbents anticipate these effects, which sometimes implies that they are less likely to choose reforms when they are more likely to be successful.
JOP 88/3 pp. 1098-1114 2026-07-01 Original A Model of Party Effects on Legislative Behavior Based on Roll Call Data
Fang-Yi Chiou, Guillermo Rosas
Abstract
(原文未提供摘要)
中文 基于唱名表决数据的政党对立法行为影响的一个模型
Fang-Yi Chiou, Guillermo Rosas
JOP — 2026-04-17
Original Meritocracy and Autocratic Power-Sharing: A Historical Perspective
Clair Yang, Yasheng Huang, Zhaomin Li
Abstract
This paper proposes meritocracy as a power-sharing institution in authoritarian regimes, particularly in weakly institutionalized environments. Contrary to what Enlightenment scholars believed, our evidence shows that meritocratic institutions were not uncommon in historical states and were often associated with absolute rulers. Using a formal model, we demonstrate that meritocracy benefits rulers by enabling them to co-opt high-ability agents, and it can remain credible even without third-party enforcement mechanisms. Unlike other power-sharing institutions, such as parliaments, which function more effectively under weaker rulers, meritocracy is more likely to emerge endogenously under strong rulers and remains self-reinforcing over time. We test these theoretical predictions using historical case studies and empirical analysis of a panel of 289 historical polities. The results confirm a positive association between meritocracy and autocracy. We believe that meritocracy can fill the gap in the literature to explain power-sharing in many historical absolute regimes.
APSR — pp. 1-17 2026-04-07 Original Bureaucratic Resistance and Policy Inefficiency
KUN HEO, ELISA WIRSCHING
Abstract
Poor public service provision creates an electoral vulnerability for incumbent politicians. Under what conditions can bureaucrats exploit this to avoid reforms they dislike? We develop a model of electoral politics in which a politician must decide whether to enact a reform of uncertain value, and a voter evaluates the incumbent’s reform based on post-reform government service quality, which anti-reform bureaucrats can undermine. Bureaucratic resistance for political leverage is most likely to occur when voters are torn between the reform and the status quo. Resistance lowers the informational value of government service for voters and can lead to policy distortions and accountability loss. When reform is moderately popular, resistance leads to policy inefficiency by preventing beneficial reforms due to electoral risks and inducing ineffective reforms by offering bureaucrats as scapegoats. Our model identifies a distinct mechanism of bureaucratic power and its implications for policy and accountability.