JOP 88/3 pp. 1098-1114 2026-07-01 Original A Model of Party Effects on Legislative Behavior Based on Roll Call Data
Fang-Yi Chiou, Guillermo Rosas
Abstract
（原文未提供摘要）
中文 基于唱名表决数据的政党对立法行为影响的一个模型
Fang-Yi Chiou, Guillermo Rosas
JOP — 2026-04-17
Original Meritocracy and Autocratic Power-Sharing: A Historical Perspective
Clair Yang, Yasheng Huang, Zhaomin Li
Abstract
This paper proposes meritocracy as a power-sharing institution in authoritarian regimes, particularly in weakly institutionalized environments. Contrary to what Enlightenment scholars believed, our evidence shows that meritocratic institutions were not uncommon in historical states and were often associated with absolute rulers. Using a formal model, we demonstrate that meritocracy benefits rulers by enabling them to co-opt high-ability agents, and it can remain credible even without third-party enforcement mechanisms. Unlike other power-sharing institutions, such as parliaments, which function more effectively under weaker rulers, meritocracy is more likely to emerge endogenously under strong rulers and remains self-reinforcing over time. We test these theoretical predictions using historical case studies and empirical analysis of a panel of 289 historical polities. The results confirm a positive association between meritocracy and autocracy. We believe that meritocracy can fill the gap in the literature to explain power-sharing in many historical absolute regimes.
APSR — pp. 1-17 2026-04-07 Original Bureaucratic Resistance and Policy Inefficiency
KUN HEO, ELISA WIRSCHING
Abstract
Poor public service provision creates an electoral vulnerability for incumbent politicians. Under what conditions can bureaucrats exploit this to avoid reforms they dislike? We develop a model of electoral politics in which a politician must decide whether to enact a reform of uncertain value, and a voter evaluates the incumbent’s reform based on post-reform government service quality, which anti-reform bureaucrats can undermine. Bureaucratic resistance for political leverage is most likely to occur when voters are torn between the reform and the status quo. Resistance lowers the informational value of government service for voters and can lead to policy distortions and accountability loss. When reform is moderately popular, resistance leads to policy inefficiency by preventing beneficial reforms due to electoral risks and inducing ineffective reforms by offering bureaucrats as scapegoats. Our model identifies a distinct mechanism of bureaucratic power and its implications for policy and accountability.