Executive Politics

PSJ — 2026-05-29 Original When Reforms Becomes Symbolic: Decabinetisation in Portugal and Beyond Arthur Meert, Patricia Silva Abstract ABSTRACT Decabinetisation—policies that reduce or restrict ministerial cabinets—presents a paradox in contemporary executive politics. Despite growing reliance on these structures for political coordination and policy steering, governments occasionally move to limit their reliance on these political staff structures, either by reducing staff numbers or by imposing stricter rules on appointments, recruitment, and remuneration. While several such reforms have been documented, we still lack a clear understanding of why governments would deliberately limit the resources and authority of the very actors that support their political and policy work. Using the 2012 Passos Coelho reform in Portugal as an in‐depth case study, this article demonstrates that decabinetisation often functions as a symbolic response to mounting political and societal demands for restraint. Although Prime Minister Passos Coelho initially aimed to implement an ambitious overhaul, internal governmental dynamics during the design and implementation stages enabled continuity actors to dilute the reform's most transformative elements. The findings highlight decabinetisation as a strategic response to a policy trap: governments must be seen to act but lack the capacity or incentive to alter institutional dependence on MCs. These dynamics extend beyond Portugal, helping to explain similar initiatives in other systems with cabinetised executives.

JOP — 2026-05-18 Original Gender Quota Laws and Women in Cabinets Tiffany Barnes, Giulia Venturini, Ana Catalano Weeks Abstract Do legislative gender quotas increase women’s presence in cabinets? Women remain underrepresented in political leadership worldwide. As a remedy, over 80 countries have adopted gender quotas, requiring parties to nominate or elect a minimum share of women. But can quotas have effects beyond the positions they directly target? We argue that quotas increase the presence of women in executive cabinets by expanding the pool of experienced female legislators. Using a global dataset (168 countries) from 1990 to 2021, we find gender quotas increase the share of women ministers by 15 percent relative to the average baseline–including increases in both high- and lowprestige portfolios. Consistent with a supply-side mechanism, effects are largest in parliamentary democracies—where ministers are often selected from parliament—and in countries that experienced the greatest increases in women’s legislative representation post-quota. The findings suggest quotas can generate meaningful spillover effects at the highest levels of government.