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Executive Accountability

Diffuse Review, Diminished Accountability: Public Reactions to Judicial Checks on Executives

JOP — 2026-10-13 Original Diffuse Review, Diminished Accountability: Public Reactions to Judicial Checks on Executives Jay Nash Krehbiel, Amanda Driscoll, Michael Nelson Abstract (原文未提供摘要) 中文 分散审查,问责削弱:公众对司法制衡行政部门的反应

Scrutiny and Recall: Rousseau on Controlling the Executive

APSR — pp. 1-16 2026-03-03 Original Scrutiny and Recall: Rousseau on Controlling the Executive ARTHUR GHINS Abstract In recent decades, political theorists have drawn on historical thinkers to explore how political elites can be held accountable. Rousseau, however, is often dismissed as reducing accountability to elections and participation to occasional ratification referenda. This article challenges that view. While Rousseau expected an elective aristocracy to execute laws ratified by the people, he also identified two mechanisms—scrutiny and recall—through which citizens could control these representatives. After reconstructing Rousseau’s account, I consider how these mechanisms could be adapted to contemporary democracies. Focused on executive accountability, the model is particularly suited to presidential systems with directly elected presidents. It combines a national jury—a citizens’ assembly chosen by lot and tasked with examining presidential actions—with the possibility of a recall referendum. By uniting deliberative scrutiny with the power to remove the head of state, this approach offers an underexplored complement to recent anti-oligarchic institutional innovations based on sortition.