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Ethnic Politics

The Representation Trap: How Minority Power Shapes Electoral Politics in India

APSR — pp. 1-20 2026-10-02 Original The Representation Trap: How Minority Power Shapes Electoral Politics in India FEYAAD ALLIE Abstract Liberal democracy requires that minority groups be represented in politics. This article argues that minority representation can also generate headwinds for political inclusion by dividing the minority group and consolidating the dominant group. I study the combination of these processes, termed the representation trap, through a mixed-methods examination of Muslims in India. Analyses of election results and an original survey of Hindu and Muslim voters show that electing a Muslim representative divides Muslim votes across an increased share of coethnic candidates and consolidates Hindu votes for the majoritarian party in the subsequent election. Qualitative evidence and a vignette experiment trace these patterns to two mechanisms: sub-identity activation among Muslims and super-ordinate identity mobilization among Hindus. By showing how representation restructures elite and voter behavior within both minority and dominant groups, the article highlights the dynamic nature of ethnic politics and complicates the view of minorities as politically unified.

The economic foundations of powersharing: Evidence from Africa

AJPS — 2026-03-04 Original The economic foundations of powersharing: Evidence from Africa Yannick I. Pengl, Philip Roessler Abstract Abstract How—and with whom—do rulers share power? Existing research focuses on the strategic logic of powersharing. In this paper, we analyze its economic foundations. Powersharing is modeled as a subnational fiscal contract, in which rulers allocate political representation based on constituencies’ revenue potential. Empirically, we combine historical geospatial data on different types of primary commodity production—mineral point resources and diffuse smallholder cash crop agriculture—with the ethnic affiliation of cabinet ministers across 15 African countries. We find that cash crop groups are overrepresented in post‐independence cabinets, while mining or food crop production does not translate into higher shares of power. Consistent with a revenue bargaining framework, we find that rulers traded political representation and targeted public services for indirect taxation of cash crops. Overall, this suggests powersharing serves not only as a means to distribute resources and co‐opt potential challengers but also to expand the pie and the rents at the ruler's disposal.