Understanding Resourcing Trade-Offs in International Organizations: Evidence from an Elite Survey Experiment
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JOP 88/3 pp. 1231-1244 2026-07-01 Original Understanding Resourcing Trade-Offs in International Organizations: Evidence from an Elite Survey Experiment
Mirko Heinzel, Bernhard Reinsberg, Christian Siauwijaya
Abstract
International organizations (IOs) are mandated to address some of the most important global challenges under intense budget scarcity. In recent years, they expanded their funding base through a greater reliance on earmarked voluntary contributions by member states and nonstate actors. Critics warn that earmarked funding creates an important trade-off: IOs can do more with earmarked funding but have less control over what they do and do it less well. In this registered report, we probe how staff evaluate different types of earmarking through a novel elite survey experiment with staff from six United Nations organizations. We show that staff prefer earmarking for their own area of work over other types of earmarking. However, these preferences do not affect the funding amount they deem as appropriate or the overheads they expect their organization to charge. Our study provides important insights for debates on the resourcing of IOs and the motivations of international bureaucrats.