APSR — pp. 1-19 2026-09-29 Original Democratic Accountability with Citizen Coproduction
JIE MA, KEITH E. SCHNAKENBERG, IAN R. TURNER
Abstract
Many policies require citizens to actively participate in their implementation in order to be successful, a situation referred to as citizen coproduction. Though citizen coproduction is necessary in many policy areas, it could create difficulties for democratic accountability because citizens and politicians share responsibility for policy failures and attribution of blame may be difficult. We analyze the problem of democratic accountability with citizen coproduction in the context of a model in which politicians, who vary with respect to their competence at selecting policies, choose whether to implement policies whose success depends on citizen coproduction choices. For citizens, the problem is one of attribution: when coproduction is low, it may be hard to select good incumbents because policy failures are frequent even when policy choices are good. Incumbents anticipate these effects, which sometimes implies that they are less likely to choose reforms when they are more likely to be successful.
APSR — pp. 1-18 2026-09-01 Original Are Voters Myopic or Looking for Improvement?
MARKUS PRIOR, TALBOT M. ANDREWS
Abstract
Abstract Timing of valence outcomes plays an important role in key theories of electoral choice, and different models place different emphases on past and future outcomes. Whereas sanctioning models consider only retrospective evaluations as an accountability mechanism, selection models hold that voters use past and proposed future conditions to infer the incumbent’s ability to deliver benefits. Drawing on four surveys run on six different samples, we demonstrate that voters prefer improving conditions in both retrospection and prospection. In retrospection, this pattern is difficult to distinguish from overweighting of temporally proximate conditions, which gave rise to the notion of “the myopic voter.” Distinguishing the two processes, we find that people do not ignore early datapoints and reward improving conditions (in both retrospection and prospection). This preference for improvement does not simply reflect an uncritical heuristic for upward trends. People are not universally myopic and many genuinely value improving aggregate conditions retrospectively and prospectively.
JOP — 2026-07-17
Original Media, Electoral Accountability, and Partisan Polarization
Daniel J. Moskowitz
Abstract
(原文未提供摘要)
中文 媒体、选举问责与党派极化
Daniel J. Moskowitz
摘要
原文未提供摘要
关键词
媒体、选举问责、党派极化、政治极化、选民行为、政党认同
DOI: 10.1086/743211
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APSR — pp. 1-17 2026-04-07 Original Bureaucratic Resistance and Policy Inefficiency
KUN HEO, ELISA WIRSCHING
Abstract
Poor public service provision creates an electoral vulnerability for incumbent politicians. Under what conditions can bureaucrats exploit this to avoid reforms they dislike? We develop a model of electoral politics in which a politician must decide whether to enact a reform of uncertain value, and a voter evaluates the incumbent’s reform based on post-reform government service quality, which anti-reform bureaucrats can undermine. Bureaucratic resistance for political leverage is most likely to occur when voters are torn between the reform and the status quo. Resistance lowers the informational value of government service for voters and can lead to policy distortions and accountability loss. When reform is moderately popular, resistance leads to policy inefficiency by preventing beneficial reforms due to electoral risks and inducing ineffective reforms by offering bureaucrats as scapegoats. Our model identifies a distinct mechanism of bureaucratic power and its implications for policy and accountability.
AJPS — 2026-03-19
Original You and whose economy? Group‐based retrospection in economic voting