APSR — pp. 1-11 2026-09-24 Original The Punitive Dimension of Presidential Particularism
LUKAS K. ALEXANDER
Abstract
Existing accounts of presidential particularism emphasize the targeted distribution of benefits to electorally valuable constituencies. This research note demonstrates that presidential particularism can also operate punitively, through the selective imposition of costs on constituencies that provided weaker electoral support for the president. I examine this dynamic through the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a highly centralized and politicized agency created at the start of Donald Trump’s second term. Leveraging data on nearly 700,000 federal contracts linked to DOGE contract cuts and 2024 county-level election returns, I show that these cuts were systematically concentrated in counties that provided weaker electoral support for Trump. These patterns hold across contract- and county-level analyses. Together, these findings broaden theories of presidential particularism by showing that presidents may use administrative authority to impose costs on electorally oppositional constituencies. More broadly, I demonstrate how presidents can wield administrative power as a tool of partisan punishment.
PAR — 2026-09-24
Original The DOGE Experiment: Algorithmic Governance, Operational Capture, and the Case for Hybrid Intelligence
Haris Alibašić
PA — 2026-09-15
Original From Civic Tech to DOGE : The Role of Tech Movements in the American Administrative State
Donald Moynihan
Abstract
ABSTRACT The second Trump administration saw the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a group of outsider technologists given extraordinary power to pursue a massive downsizing of the federal government. They also displaced an alternative approach: the civic tech movement. Civic tech for government applies technology, data, and human‐centered design to improve policy implementation, fueled by prosocial motivation, promising to increase state capacity in a way that centers attention on public service clients. This article explains the origins of civic tech for government in the US setting, its core values, and evolution. The movement grew in prominence and influence from 2014 to 2024, making steady inroads into government but never gaining sufficient power to implement profound change. The conflicting origins, philosophy, and power between civic tech and DOGE offer contrasting visions for how tech can reshape the American administrative state.
PAR — 2026-08-21
Original Informal Authority, Legitimacy Transition, and Institutional Change: A Theory of Advisory Capture
Byunggeor Moon
Abstract
ABSTRACT How do informal actors achieve rapid bureaucratic dismantlement without formal authority? Analyzing the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) initiative, this article argues that when performance‐based legitimacy displaces procedural legitimacy as the dominant evaluative framework, informal actors can bypass established safeguards and reshape government institutions. Three concepts capture this process: advisory capture , legitimacy regime transition , and constrained coercion . The analysis reveals that dismantlement targets agencies based on political vulnerability rather than functional logic, that informal authority becomes institutionalized through formal rulemaking such as the Schedule Policy/Career rule, and that judicial review operates as ongoing contestation rather than definitive constraint. Protecting democratic governance requires defending not only formal rules but the legitimacy regimes within which those rules derive meaning.