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Distributive Politics

When Can Clientelism Serve Democratic Ends? A Democratic Theory of Distributive Politics

APSR — pp. 1-15 2026-10-08 Original When Can Clientelism Serve Democratic Ends? A Democratic Theory of Distributive Politics SAMUEL ELY BAGG, UDIT BHATIA Abstract This article employs normative democratic theory to examine a counterintuitive suggestion raised repeatedly by empirical scholars of clientelism: namely, that practices of particularistic exchange might sometimes serve democratic ends. Certainly, most particularistic practices are widely agreed to undermine democracy, on both intrinsic and instrumental grounds. Yet some observers resist blanket condemnation—and in particular, many highlight the redeeming democratic virtues of certain practices that seem to facilitate collective organization among disempowered groups. Drawing on “realist” approaches to democratic theory, we vindicate this basic insight while clarifying its scope conditions. Countervailing power is a crucial democratic priority, and programmatic methods of promoting it sometimes face serious obstacles: as when clientelist practices are deeply entrenched, or incumbents capture the tools of programmatic competition. Under such conditions, we conclude, democracy-seeking leaders may justifiably employ particularistic practices to promote countervailing power—but only if they respect five constraints tethering them strictly to that goal.

Crossing the District Line: Border Mismatch and Targeted Redistribution

JOP 88/4 pp. 1527-1541 2026-10-01 Original Crossing the District Line: Border Mismatch and Targeted Redistribution Allison Stashko Abstract (原文未提供摘要) 中文 跨越选区界线:边界错配与定向再分配 Allison Stashko 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 选区界线、边界错配、定向再分配、分配政治、选举地理、美国政治 DOI: 10.1086/736999 查看原文 →

Feeding the Coalition: How Presidents Use State Banks to Buy Legislative Support for Governability

GOV 39/2 2026-03-11 Original Feeding the Coalition: How Presidents Use State Banks to Buy Legislative Support for Governability Rodrigo B. DeMello, Carlos Pereira Abstract ABSTRACT This paper develops and tests a theory of how presidents use government agencies to manage legislative coalitions in multiparty presidential systems. We argue that agency decisions—particularly subsidized credit from state‐owned development banks—function as retail coalition goods that sustain legislative support. Legislators are more likely to back the president when agency resources benefit subnational politicians who are both partisan allies and vital to their reelection networks. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close mayoral elections in Brazil and loan‐level data from the National Development Bank (BNDES), we find that municipalities governed by coalition‐aligned mayors receive significantly more favorable loan terms. Linking these data to roll‐call votes, we show that legislators become more supportive of the president after loans are granted in their electoral strongholds managed by co‐partisan mayors. These findings reveal how distributive agency decisions translate into legislative support, integrating bureaucratic discretion into theories of coalition management.