Disaster Relief

JOP — pp. 000-000 2026-04-17 Original Do Voters Value Relief over Preparedness? Evidence from Disaster Policies in Malawi Felix Hartmann Abstract Growing evidence suggests that voters reward politicians for spending on disaster relief but not disaster preparedness. Yet, we know little about the mechanisms that underpin this pattern. Is it because voters generally value relief over preparedness? Or is it because voters expect preparedness policies to be less effective compared to relief policies? I test both mechanisms using a conjoint experiment in rural Malawi in which participants choose between two hypothetical candidates randomly varying attributes about their preparedness and relief policies. I find that respondents reward relief efforts over preparedness efforts, but they value effective preparedness similarly to effective relief. Additionally, respondents are more likely to reward preparedness efforts if they repeatedly observe that they are effective in mitigating disaster damages. Taken together, the evidence suggests that voters have pessimistic expectations about the effectiveness of preparedness policies but would reward preparedness similarly to relief if it is known to be effective.

JOP 88/2 pp. 746-759 2026-04-01 Original The Politics of Disaster Prevention Martin Gilens, Tali Mendelberg, Nicholas Short Abstract Despite the importance of effective disaster policy, governments typically fail to produce it. The main explanation offered by political scientists is that voters strongly support postdisaster relief but not policies that seek to prevent or prepare for disaster. This study challenges that view. We develop novel measures of preferences for disaster prevention and postdisaster relief. We find strong support for prevention policies and candidates who pursue them, even among the subgroups that are the most opposed. Support for prevention has the hallmarks of “real” attitudes: consistency across wordings and response formats, including open-ended probes; steadfastness in the face of arguments; and willingness to make trade-offs against disaster relief, increased taxes, and reduced spending on other programs. Neither cognitive biases for the here and now nor partisan polarization prevent robust majority support for disaster prevention. We validate these survey findings with election results, which suggest voters act on these preferences.