PAR — 2026-08-10
Original Putting Democratic Theory and Principles of Justice in the Right Place: Ethical Pluralism in Collaborative and Participatory Governance
Alexander L. Q. Chen‐Florea
APSR — pp. 1-12 2026-07-30 Original A Democratic Theory of Labor Unions
STEVEN KLEIN
Abstract
Recently, political theorists have been increasingly concerned with the implications of democratic values for work. This article contributes to these debates by examining the main vehicle through which workers, historically, have sought democracy at work: the labor union. The article defends a vision of economic democracy that arises from the practice of labor unions. It then emphasizes the distinctive features of labor unions that make them potential vehicles for democracy in other domains. Labor unions are particularly important means of advancing democratic values for three reasons: (1) their ability to appeal to the short- and mid-term self-interest of their members; (2) their anchor in the material reproduction of society; and (3) that they rely on attitudes of cooperation and solidarity among their members. Yet these three features also point to potential limitations of labor unions as laboratories of democracy.
PAR 86/5 pp. 1225-1234 2026-05-19 Original How Was Democracy Under the Administrative Presidency Supposed to Work?
Ben Merriman
Abstract
ABSTRACT Aggressive use of the administrative power of the presidency is a major source of public administrative concern about the health of American democracy. Many of these powers stem from executive branch reorganization in the late 1930s, which was conceived and implemented by founding figures in the modern field. Fear for democracy defined reorganization. Reorganizers elaborated a working theory about the conditions under which strong presidential administration could preserve and strengthen democracy: structured internal friction in the executive branch to recreate traditional checks on administrative conduct; identification and promotion of a corps of socially and politically astute administrators; and a watchful Congress. This design relied on a political approach to administration that created few managerial or legal safeguards. As subsequent polarization has altered the political order under which executive reorganization was conceived, the institutional powers of the presidency have emerged as a threat to democratic arrangements, rather than a bulwark.
JOP 88/2 pp. 826-838 2026-04-01 Original Defending Elections Against the Oligarchic Charge
Palle Bech-Pedersen
Abstract
This article counters the claim, advanced by lottocrats, that elections are inherently oligarchic. I begin by examining the theory of elections that sees them as a superior mechanism for selecting candidates, showing that this implication fails to render elections as inherently oligarchic because superiority is context dependent. Next, I demonstrate that the advantage of wealth arising from the cost of disseminating information is empirically contingent and, thus, not attributable to the nature of elections. I then offer a pathway for the deoligarchization of elections, distinguishing between doxastic and structural obstacles to inclusion. I demonstrate how ideology critique and certain structural reforms offer solutions to these obstacles. I conclude by addressing the rebuttal that elections remain very likely to be oligarchic and that sortition fares comparatively better on this front. I argue that this line of argument overlooks the undemocratic implications and risks of oligarchization that would emerge from adopting sortition.