Democratic Backsliding

PAR — 2026-09-10 Original Restoring the Deformed Administrative State? Bureaucratic Repair After Illiberal Rule Michael W. Bauer, Daniel Kovarek, Bárbara Motta, Andrzej Schultz

PAR — 2026-09-01 Original The Role of Public Administrators in Building a Robust Liberal Democracy Eva Sørensen, Jacob Torfing

JPART — 2026-08-27 Original Civil Servants and Democratic Backsliding: The Role of Managerial Signals Mads Pieter van Luttervelt, Mathias Rask Østergaard-Nielsen, Martin Bækgaard, Zuzana Murdoch, Benny Geys

PAR — 2026-08-19 Original Democratic Backsliding and Governance Outcomes: Measuring Administrative and Political Channels of Decline David Ibañez, Ricardo A. Bello‐Gómez

GOV 39/3 2026-07-10 Original Institutional Backsliding Under Liberal Democratic Backsliding: Central Bank Independence Reversal in Türkiye Caner Bakir Abstract ABSTRACT Despite the importance of research strands in identifying the micro‐mechanisms underpinning illiberal governance and democratic backsliding under populist or patrimonial rule in both liberal and illiberal democracies, the implications of populist‐patrimonial interventions by strong political leaders aiming for institutional backsliding have not been studied in detail. Drawing on a within‐case temporal comparison of erosion of central bank independence in Turkiye under the prolonged rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, this article focuses on the backsliding of legal‐rational institutional logic (e.g., loyalty to legal and professional rules and practices such as impersonality, neutrality, professionalism, and meritocracy) that informs political leader and bureaucrat interactions and their replacement with patrimonial institutional logic (e.g., absolute personal loyalty to a leader). It argues that the disruptive (defensive) institutional work of populist‐patrimonial strongman (insiders) is most likely to be effective in achieving institutional backsliding (maintenance) in public administration when the political regime structure, its main institutions, and agential‐level factors motivate and empower his prolonged, consistent, and persistent disruptive (defensive) institutional work.

PAR 86/5 pp. 1213-1224 2026-06-21 Original Reclaiming Weber: Bureaucracy as Democracy's Last Line of Defense Patricia Nemeth Abstract ABSTRACT Max Weber's rational–legal bureaucracy remains a vital safeguard amid populist backlash, civil service politicization, and democratic backsliding. This article reframes bureaucracy as a conditional democratic safeguard—one that depends on ethical orientation and professional integrity, not technical capacity alone. When legality is hollowed out through obedience or anticipatory compliance, institutions corrode from within. Evidence from recent cases of executive politicization illustrates how ethical substance erodes behind formally intact institutions. By integrating Weber's structural rationality with Waldo's claim that democracy is fundamentally an ethic requiring value‐laden judgment, the article develops the notion of a “compliance trap” and recasts public servants as ethical constitutional agents rather than passive implementers. It also advances a framework for bureaucratic renewal grounded in ethical discipline, participatory design, and professional autonomy, arguing that administrators must be prepared to exercise principled judgment when other democratic safeguards weaken.

PAR — 2026-05-28 Original How Democratic Backsliding Shapes the Entry, Non‐Entry, and Waiting of Potential Civil Servants

PSJ — 2026-03-30 Original Coalition Breakdown and Subsystem Exit Charlie F. Thompson Abstract ABSTRACT Why actors choose to work together (or not) to advance policy has been the central area of inquiry within the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). Existing research has mainly emphasized the pathway towards coalition formation and evolution, underscoring the stable patterns of allies and opponents observable in policy processes over a decade or so. Why coalitions fracture, splinter or dissolve has seldom been theoretically articulated or empirically investigated, which leaves policy process research in the dark on the unstable factors of coalition evolution. This perspectives stresses three modes of coalition breakdown—the process by which an established advocacy coalition (i) fractures—a mode of enhanced internal conflict producing differentiated coordination patterns, (ii) splinters into competing coalitions—where previous allies stop working together entirely, and (iii) dissolves—the subsystem exit of an existing coalition. Focusing on internal threats, but also the external shocks provided by democratic backsliding, the article advances foundational theory on why coalitions fissure, become dormant and collapse—policy dynamics that are expected to continue to persist in an increasingly polarized society.

GOV 39/2 2026-03-15 Original Beyond Democratic Backsliding: Bureaucracy, Elite Dynamics and Administrative Change in Authoritarian Transitions Kutsal Yesilkagit, Johan Christensen Abstract ABSTRACT This paper examines how political and administrative elites shape regime transformations under authoritarian rule, proposing an elite‐centered analytical perspective that complements prevailing accounts of “democratic backsliding.” We show how embedding political–administrative relations within a broader elite‐theoretical framework clarifies the mechanisms through which elite reconfiguration underwrites institutional erosion. Drawing on classical and contemporary elite theory, we argue that shifts in elite coalitions among politicians, bureaucrats, and economic actors drive regime changes more than institutional erosion or ideological movements. Through comparative historical analysis of interwar Italy and Germany, we illustrate distinct elite‐driven pathways to authoritarian consolidation: Mussolini's Italy involved strategic alliances with traditional elites, while Hitler's Germany pursued radical elite replacement. Our findings highlight the critical role of elite realignments in transforming institutions and economic policies, often maintaining a façade of electoral legitimacy. This elite‐theoretical approach offers nuanced insights into contemporary shifts toward autocratic governance, emphasizing the importance of analyzing elite networks and interactions to comprehend the deeper mechanics of political transformation. Our findings thus contribute to public administration scholarship by theorizing how elite realignments transform bureaucratic structures and alter the nature of political‐administrative relationships under authoritarian conditions.