↓ 跳过正文

Decentralization

Delegating Digital Policing: The Evolution of China’s Security-Industrial Complex

CQ — pp. 1-17 2026-11-03 Original Delegating Digital Policing: The Evolution of China’s Security-Industrial Complex Jingyang Huang Abstract Abstract How did China build its formidable digital policing apparatus so rapidly? While prevailing narratives emphasize top-down state direction, this statist perspective obscures critical local dynamics. This article argues that China’s security-industrial complex actually emerged from decentralized administrative pressures. Burdened by unfunded, time-sensitive central security mandates, resource-strapped local security agencies abandoned state-led technological development and outsourced to the private sector. Drawing on extensive field interviews (2017–2022) and policy analysis, this study traces the complex’s evolution through three interrelated mechanisms: the decentralization of internal security politics, the formation of hybrid public–private partnerships, and the varied transactional behaviour exhibited by capitalists, as well as between government and business, in a multi-layered system. By demonstrating how localized security projects inadvertently catalysed technological innovation, this research reveals the hidden market-driven roots of China’s security-industrial complex. It offers a novel framework for understanding how the party-state adaptively leverages capital for building a digital security state.

Every Mile Counts: Geographical Distance as Administrative Burden in Intellectual Property Services

JPART — 2026-10-29 Original Every Mile Counts: Geographical Distance as Administrative Burden in Intellectual Property Services Shenghua Lu Abstract Abstract While existing research has examined procedural and informational sources of administrative burden, this paper examines how organizational design choices about the geographic location of administrative authority institutionalize spatial burdens on firms. We leverage China's decentralization reform in trademark registration services as a natural experiment to test this theory. This reform reduced geographic distance by establishing local acceptance windows across the country from 2016 to 2019. Prior to this reform, trademark applications had to be submitted exclusively at the centralized Beijing office, imposing substantial geographic barriers on firms nationwide. Using a unique dataset covering over 37 million trademark applications from 294 Chinese cities, we employ a staggered difference-in-differences approach to estimate the causal effects of reduced geographic distance on trademark filings. We find that establishing local acceptance windows increased trademark applications by approximately 4.4 percent, or roughly 209,000 additional filings in 2019 alone. Moreover, the reform generated compound distributional outcomes: small and medium-sized enterprises responded more strongly than larger firms, and the new applicants drawn into the trademark system were concentrated in cities with thinner infrastructure. Mechanism analysis confirms that this increase is primarily driven by distance reduction rather than improvements in administrative efficiency or reductions in corruption. The findings provide large-scale causal evidence on the behavioral consequences of redistributing administrative service delivery across space, demonstrating that physical accessibility remains crucial for equitable service uptake even amid the digital transformation of administrative services.

Decentralization as an anticorruption strategy: does revenue autonomy make a difference?

PMR — pp. 1-32 2026-10-07 Original Decentralization as an anticorruption strategy: does revenue autonomy make a difference? Fabio Monteduro, Riccardo Mussari Abstract This study investigates how revenue autonomy is associated with documented municipal corruption risk, distinguishing between own-source tax and non-tax revenues. Drawing on public administration theories of decentralization, it adopts a meso-level analysis of Italian medium-to-large municipalities and relies on an event-based indicator derived from legally mandated anticorruption reports. The empirical strategy combines dynamic correlated random-effects logit, dynamic random-effects probit, and fixed-effects logit models, complemented by sensitivity analyses simulating under-reporting scenarios. Results indicate that higher levels of both tax and non-tax revenue autonomy are negatively associated with documented corruption risk. Tax autonomy shows stronger associations where political competition is higher, whereas the non-tax revenue pattern is more consistent with a service-based responsiveness logic. These findings, observed in the Italian municipal context, suggest that revenue autonomy is not a uniform anticorruption safeguard but an institutional feature whose relevance depends on revenue composition, accountability conditions, municipal capacity, and reporting practices.