Observable Bounds of Rationality and Credibility in International Relations
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JOP 88/2 pp. 839-853 2026-04-01 Original Observable Bounds of Rationality and Credibility in International Relations
Andrew Kenealy, Trent Ollerenshaw, So Jin Lee
Abstract
In crisis bargaining scenarios, resolved states send costly signals to demonstrate a willingness to fight. Yet, public signals of resolve are issued by specific leaders, who operate with cognitive limitations in challenging decision environments. Drawing upon theories of behavioral economics, we develop a series of observable indicators plausibly connected to leader ability and difficulty of decision environment that we expect shape perceived signaler credibility. Effects, we argue, are due to perceived variation in the signaler’s uncertainty over the future costs at stake. We find that almost all indicators shape threat credibility and find suggestive support for the proposed mechanism. By bridging behavioral economics and foundational scholarship on costly signaling in international relations (IR) in novel ways, this registered report shows how individual and environmental decision restrictions set the bounds of observable leader rationality and, in turn, shape credibility in IR.