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COVID-19

Did populist governance change corruption risks during crises across European countries?

·439 字·1 分钟
Polihot 公共行政 比较政治 Populism Corruption Risk Public Procurement COVID-19 EU
PMR — pp. 1-28 2026-06-11 Original Did populist governance change corruption risks during crises across European countries? Giuliana Ioannidis Abstract This study examines whether populist governance shaped public procurement corruption risks during COVID-19 across 23 EU Member States. Despite common emergency rules, corruption risks varied markedly. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and the Corruption Risk Index, the study finds that populist governance combined with poor integrity norms is sufficient to explain high corruption risk increases. Populist-led governments intensify risks by undermining oversight, exploiting legal loopholes, and legitimizing rule-breaking through anti-elite narratives, particularly where accountability cultures are weak. Anti-corruption strategies must therefore account for crisis conditions and politicized governance, ensuring independent oversight mechanisms remain intact under populist rule.

Executive–Legislative Policymaking Under Crisis

·698 字·2 分钟
Polihot 美国政治 公共政策 Executive-Legislative Relations COVID-19 US States Unilateral Executive Action Policymaking Under Crisis
JOP 88/2 pp. 882-887 2026-04-01 Original Executive–Legislative Policymaking Under Crisis Nathaniel A. Birkhead, Jeffrey J. Harden, Jason H. Windett Abstract Does conventional wisdom explain policymaking during a domestic crisis on a novel issue? We consider executive–legislative interactions in the American states during the COVID-19 pandemic to address problems in the study of unilateral executive action. Empirical analyses of crisis policymaking often examine wartime presidents or localized natural disasters but confront difficulties in identifying the status quo policy. COVID-19 created a large-scale domestic crisis and a status quo that was known with relative certainty. We develop a canonical theoretical account of executive–legislative interaction and test it using COVID-19 executive orders issued and legislation introduced and passed during 2020 to 2022. Results show that governors’ proposals met expectations, but legislatures’ responses did not. Instead, partisanship and ideological factors, which crystallized over time, largely determined legislative policy choices. We conclude that standard theory does not adequately account for preference dynamics that might emerge due to delays between the executive’s proposal and the legislature’s response.

Between Withdrawal and Engagement: Disentangling the Effects of COVID-19 on Turnout

·527 字·2 分钟
Polihot 政治行为 Turnout COVID-19 Mortality Policy Feedback Triple Differences
JOP 88/2 pp. 888-892 2026-04-01 Original Between Withdrawal and Engagement: Disentangling the Effects of COVID-19 on Turnout Kevin T. Morris Abstract This project marks the first test of the household-level turnout effects of living with someone who died from COVID-19. Drawing on policy feedback and threat literatures, I argue that the theoretical effects of close COVID contact are unclear. I link death records with the registered voter file to identity Americans who lived with a decedent, leveraging a triple-differences design to distinguish the effect of household COVID deaths on turnout from non-COVID ones in Minnesota, North Carolina, and Washington State. Household COVID deaths reduced turnout in all three states, though the effect was different (and larger) than non-COVID household deaths only in Washington. I thus conclude that while COVID deaths clearly lowered household turnout, they operated largely through the opportunity costs associated with household deaths more generally rather than a distinctly political response to the government’s handling of the pandemic.