GOV 39/4 2026-08-30
Original Social Norms, State Punishment, and Motivation Crowding in Anti‐Corruption Messaging: Experimental Evidence From China
AJPS — 2026-07-02
Original Bureaucrat assignments as instruments of political control: Theory and evidence from land administration officials in India
Anustubh Agnihotri, Aditya Dasgupta, Devesh Kapur
JOP 88/3 pp. 1202-1215 2026-07-01 Original Soft Power as Constituency Cultivation
Scott A. Tyson, Ethan Kapstein, Audrye Wong
Abstract
How do foreign agents, representing countries or other political actors, exert influence in another country? While scholars have directed considerable theoretical and empirical attention toward “hard power” (e.g., coercion [explicit or implicit] and corruption/bribery), far less consideration has been devoted to understanding the theoretical mechanisms associated with “soft” channels of political influence. We develop a novel theory of soft power as constituency cultivation whereby an actor (government or firm) makes a targeted investment in a foreign society with the objective of creating greater policy alignment among a set of politically relevant actors (the policy selectorate). We consider two factors that influence constituency cultivation, preexisting interest congruence and coordination (e.g., focal points), and extend our model to include corruption and other forms of bribery. We show how the potential for corruption/bribery can enhance the benefits from soft power, implying that corruption and soft power are complementary forms of influence.
PAR — 2026-04-21
Original When Do Citizens Support Corrupt Politicians? The Trade‐Offs Between Corruption and Competence
PAR — 2026-04-16
Original Do Performance Budgeting Reforms Reduce Corruption? Evidence From a Quasi‐Experimental Study
PA — 2026-04-07
Original Fighting Corruption Through Accountability? A Survey Experiment
Ming‐feng Kuo, Hsini Huang
Abstract
ABSTRACT Democratic Weberian bureaucracy is facing great challenges upholding public values as we see turbulent party politics disrupt merit‐based systems, causing bureaucrats' goal displacement and conflicting compliance under multiple accountability mechanisms. Using vignette experiment design, 555 Taiwanese public employees were surveyed to explore how legal, administrative, and social accountabilities influence the perception of black, gray, and white corruption. While respondents accurately identified corruption severity, accountability reminders diminish ethical judgments and are ineffective in explaining whistle‐blowing intention. The study revealed that organizational positions interact differently with accountability reminders in a Weberian bureaucracy. Findings highlight the need to cultivate ethical judgment to shift from external controls to trigger greater perceived accountability to combat corruption. This study sheds light on both felt accountability and corruption theories to reflect existing anti‐corruption strategies.