↓ 跳过正文

Corruption

Decentralization as an anticorruption strategy: does revenue autonomy make a difference?

PMR — pp. 1-32 2026-10-07 Original Decentralization as an anticorruption strategy: does revenue autonomy make a difference? Fabio Monteduro, Riccardo Mussari Abstract This study investigates how revenue autonomy is associated with documented municipal corruption risk, distinguishing between own-source tax and non-tax revenues. Drawing on public administration theories of decentralization, it adopts a meso-level analysis of Italian medium-to-large municipalities and relies on an event-based indicator derived from legally mandated anticorruption reports. The empirical strategy combines dynamic correlated random-effects logit, dynamic random-effects probit, and fixed-effects logit models, complemented by sensitivity analyses simulating under-reporting scenarios. Results indicate that higher levels of both tax and non-tax revenue autonomy are negatively associated with documented corruption risk. Tax autonomy shows stronger associations where political competition is higher, whereas the non-tax revenue pattern is more consistent with a service-based responsiveness logic. These findings, observed in the Italian municipal context, suggest that revenue autonomy is not a uniform anticorruption safeguard but an institutional feature whose relevance depends on revenue composition, accountability conditions, municipal capacity, and reporting practices.

Soft Power as Constituency Cultivation

JOP 88/3 pp. 1202-1215 2026-07-01 Original Soft Power as Constituency Cultivation Scott A. Tyson, Ethan Kapstein, Audrye Wong Abstract How do foreign agents, representing countries or other political actors, exert influence in another country? While scholars have directed considerable theoretical and empirical attention toward “hard power” (e.g., coercion [explicit or implicit] and corruption/bribery), far less consideration has been devoted to understanding the theoretical mechanisms associated with “soft” channels of political influence. We develop a novel theory of soft power as constituency cultivation whereby an actor (government or firm) makes a targeted investment in a foreign society with the objective of creating greater policy alignment among a set of politically relevant actors (the policy selectorate). We consider two factors that influence constituency cultivation, preexisting interest congruence and coordination (e.g., focal points), and extend our model to include corruption and other forms of bribery. We show how the potential for corruption/bribery can enhance the benefits from soft power, implying that corruption and soft power are complementary forms of influence.

Fighting Corruption Through Accountability? A Survey Experiment

PA — 2026-04-07 Original Fighting Corruption Through Accountability? A Survey Experiment Ming‐feng Kuo, Hsini Huang Abstract ABSTRACT Democratic Weberian bureaucracy is facing great challenges upholding public values as we see turbulent party politics disrupt merit‐based systems, causing bureaucrats' goal displacement and conflicting compliance under multiple accountability mechanisms. Using vignette experiment design, 555 Taiwanese public employees were surveyed to explore how legal, administrative, and social accountabilities influence the perception of black, gray, and white corruption. While respondents accurately identified corruption severity, accountability reminders diminish ethical judgments and are ineffective in explaining whistle‐blowing intention. The study revealed that organizational positions interact differently with accountability reminders in a Weberian bureaucracy. Findings highlight the need to cultivate ethical judgment to shift from external controls to trigger greater perceived accountability to combat corruption. This study sheds light on both felt accountability and corruption theories to reflect existing anti‐corruption strategies.