Coordination

PNAS 123/31 pp. e2606267123-e2606267123 2026-07-27 Original When coordination is avoidable: A monotonicity analysis of organizational tasks Harang Ju Abstract Organizations devote substantial resources to coordination, yet which tasks actually require it for correctness remains unclear. The problem is acute in multiagent AI systems, where coordination cost is directly measurable and can exceed the cost of the work itself. Distributed systems theory provides a precise criterion: Coordination is required when a task specification is nonmonotonic, meaning that as histories grow, new information can invalidate prior conclusions. Here we show that Thompson's classic taxonomy of interdependence maps to that criterion, yielding a decision rule for when coordination is required for correctness. We formalize the correspondence in a bridge theorem, apply the rule to 65 workflows from the American Productivity & Quality Center (APQC), and (with a calibrated large language model (LLM), 13,417 Occupational Information Network (O*NET tasks), and illustrate it in multiagent AI simulations. Under our decompositions, 74% of workflows and 42% of O*NET tasks are monotonic, implying that up to 24 to 57% of coordination spending is unnecessary for correctness.

AJPS — 2026-07-01 Original State surveillance and collective dissent Gaétan Nandong Abstract Abstract State surveillance facilitates the collection of intelligence on dissidents while simultaneously providing information about the value of the status quo. I study this trade‐off in a context where an uninformed government must decide whether to repress. Because citizens expect more informed governments to enact greater repression, autocratic surveillance can create a climate of fear. However, surveillance can also stimulate dissent when citizens have access to public information. State surveillance gives citizens an opportunity to coordinate, even in the absence of a preference for such coordination. Surveillance can amplify dissent by enhancing citizens' motivations for political activism aimed at drawing the government's attention to political and economic issues. Coordination distorts government learning, resulting in lower expected levels of repression. The analysis further indicates that the effectiveness of advanced surveillance technology depends on expectations regarding repression, thereby underscoring a psychological aspect of state control.