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Conjoint Experiment

Accountability systems and coping in the bureaucratic environment

PMR — pp. 1-26 2026-08-01 Original Accountability systems and coping in the bureaucratic environment Christine H. Roch, Ellen V. Rubin Abstract Advocates for strengthening accountability in government assume stronger consequences will change bureaucratic behavior. This study considers whether more strict accountability regimes change bureaucrats’ discretionary efforts. We consider this puzzle using a conjoint experiment with teachers in New York State. Our results show street-level bureaucrats in high accountability settings prioritize low-performing clients, while street-level bureaucrats in moderate accountability settings prioritize clients exhibiting high levels of effort. Overall, teachers demonstrate a weak preference to provide extra assistance to students who are hardworking and low-performing.

Attitudes Toward Electoral System Reform and Party System Change in the U.S.

APSR — pp. 1-24 2026-05-14 Original Attitudes Toward Electoral System Reform and Party System Change in the U.S. QUINTON MAYNE, SHANE P. SINGH Abstract Electoral reform efforts in the United States are widespread, yet little is known about how Americans evaluate alternative electoral systems or their consequences. We address this gap using conjoint and vignette experiments to study how Americans assess electoral reforms based on their implications for the number of parties and the degree of ideological polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives. Focusing on democratic voice, governability, and responsiveness, our designs emphasize party-system outcomes rather than technical institutional features that may be difficult for citizens to understand. We find that Americans are strongly averse to reforms that generate pronounced legislative polarization, even when it might be expected to enhance democratic voice. Findings pertaining to multipartism are more mixed, with some evidence that respondents respond positively to moderate departures from the two-party system. Perceived gains in voice and responsiveness do not generally compensate for losses in governability, except under arrangements that avoid polarization.

Do Voters Value Relief over Preparedness? Evidence from Disaster Policies in Malawi

JOP — pp. 000-000 2026-04-17 Original Do Voters Value Relief over Preparedness? Evidence from Disaster Policies in Malawi Felix Hartmann Abstract Growing evidence suggests that voters reward politicians for spending on disaster relief but not disaster preparedness. Yet, we know little about the mechanisms that underpin this pattern. Is it because voters generally value relief over preparedness? Or is it because voters expect preparedness policies to be less effective compared to relief policies? I test both mechanisms using a conjoint experiment in rural Malawi in which participants choose between two hypothetical candidates randomly varying attributes about their preparedness and relief policies. I find that respondents reward relief efforts over preparedness efforts, but they value effective preparedness similarly to effective relief. Additionally, respondents are more likely to reward preparedness efforts if they repeatedly observe that they are effective in mitigating disaster damages. Taken together, the evidence suggests that voters have pessimistic expectations about the effectiveness of preparedness policies but would reward preparedness similarly to relief if it is known to be effective.