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Clientelism

When Can Clientelism Serve Democratic Ends? A Democratic Theory of Distributive Politics

APSR — pp. 1-15 2026-10-08 Original When Can Clientelism Serve Democratic Ends? A Democratic Theory of Distributive Politics SAMUEL ELY BAGG, UDIT BHATIA Abstract This article employs normative democratic theory to examine a counterintuitive suggestion raised repeatedly by empirical scholars of clientelism: namely, that practices of particularistic exchange might sometimes serve democratic ends. Certainly, most particularistic practices are widely agreed to undermine democracy, on both intrinsic and instrumental grounds. Yet some observers resist blanket condemnation—and in particular, many highlight the redeeming democratic virtues of certain practices that seem to facilitate collective organization among disempowered groups. Drawing on “realist” approaches to democratic theory, we vindicate this basic insight while clarifying its scope conditions. Countervailing power is a crucial democratic priority, and programmatic methods of promoting it sometimes face serious obstacles: as when clientelist practices are deeply entrenched, or incumbents capture the tools of programmatic competition. Under such conditions, we conclude, democracy-seeking leaders may justifiably employ particularistic practices to promote countervailing power—but only if they respect five constraints tethering them strictly to that goal.

Brake or bridge? The dual impact of clientelism on hospital corporatization in Iran

PMR — pp. 1-32 2026-09-15 Original Brake or bridge? The dual impact of clientelism on hospital corporatization in Iran Maryam Zahmatkesh, Ian Kirkpatrick Abstract Public management reforms like corporatization often fail due to a lack of cultural and institutional compatibility, leading to divergence from globally prescribed reform models rather than convergence towards their intended managerial and organizational outcomes. While global templates prioritize managerial autonomy and efficiency, national ‘cultural ecologies’ filter these changes, sometimes creating deceptive window dressing to secure external legitimacy. This paper addresses a significant gap in current research by exploring how social relationships governed by clientelism – integral to the cultural ecologies of many countries – also impact on reform implementation. Using the Iranian healthcare sector as a case study, the paper investigates whether clientelism inevitably derails corporatization (the brake) or serves as an inherent cultural component that managers must navigate to achieve organizational goals (the bridge).

From Contention to Clientelism: Evidence from the Ten-Year Fishing Ban in China

CQ 266 pp. 385-399 2026-04-13 Original From Contention to Clientelism: Evidence from the Ten-Year Fishing Ban in China Jingping Liu Abstract Abstract How do ordinary Chinese people circumvent unpopular state policies? The existing literature primarily focuses on resistance against local bureaucrats. Drawing on ethnographic research on the ten-year fishing ban in the Yangtze River Basin, this article finds that fishermen (clients) continue to fish by maintaining patron–client relationships with the enforcers of the fishing ban (patrons). Ordinary fishermen seek the protection of enforcers through bribery. Enhanced state monitoring under the fishing ban facilitates bribery-based clientelism by weakening the fishermen’s everyday resistance, but it also constrains the power of enforcers by increasing the risk that their corruption will be discovered by upper-level authorities. For extremely poor fishermen, who are barely able to afford to pay bribes, their daily acts of resistance are morally justified by the need for subsistence safety, presenting enforcers with a dilemma: they must fulfil their law enforcement duties while also ensuring the survival of these individuals to maintain social stability. Therefore, cultivating a clientelist relationship with impoverished fishermen enables enforcers to manage their noncompliance, thereby balancing these conflicting goals. While clientelism protects people from unpopular policies to some extent, it more fundamentally strengthens the power of local bureaucrats, creating the potential for greater exploitation and larger-scale popular grievances in the long run.

Social Density, Clientelism, and Community Benefits

JOP 88/2 pp. 509-525 2026-04-01 Original Social Density, Clientelism, and Community Benefits Jeremy Spater, Erik Wibbels Abstract How does the social structure of a neighborhood affect the linkage strategies chosen by politicians? Our argument links the social centrality of individuals and the social density of neighborhoods to the incidence of individual-level clientelism and the contingent provision of neighborhood benefits, respectively. We test the resulting hypotheses using a combination of original network, experimental and nonexperimental survey data collected across 9,184 households in 217 slums across three cities in India. We find that socially central individuals are more likely to be targeted with private clientelism and that more socially dense neighborhoods are more likely to coordinate votes, attract benefits, and achieve the legal prerequisites for public services.