PMR — pp. 1-32 2026-09-15 Original Brake or bridge? The dual impact of clientelism on hospital corporatization in Iran
Maryam Zahmatkesh, Ian Kirkpatrick
Abstract
（原文未提供摘要）
中文 刹车还是桥梁？庇护主义对伊朗医院公司化的双重影响
Maryam Zahmatkesh, Ian Kirkpatrick
CQ 266 pp. 385-399 2026-04-13 Original From Contention to Clientelism: Evidence from the Ten-Year Fishing Ban in China
Jingping Liu
Abstract
Abstract How do ordinary Chinese people circumvent unpopular state policies? The existing literature primarily focuses on resistance against local bureaucrats. Drawing on ethnographic research on the ten-year fishing ban in the Yangtze River Basin, this article finds that fishermen (clients) continue to fish by maintaining patron–client relationships with the enforcers of the fishing ban (patrons). Ordinary fishermen seek the protection of enforcers through bribery. Enhanced state monitoring under the fishing ban facilitates bribery-based clientelism by weakening the fishermen’s everyday resistance, but it also constrains the power of enforcers by increasing the risk that their corruption will be discovered by upper-level authorities. For extremely poor fishermen, who are barely able to afford to pay bribes, their daily acts of resistance are morally justified by the need for subsistence safety, presenting enforcers with a dilemma: they must fulfil their law enforcement duties while also ensuring the survival of these individuals to maintain social stability. Therefore, cultivating a clientelist relationship with impoverished fishermen enables enforcers to manage their noncompliance, thereby balancing these conflicting goals. While clientelism protects people from unpopular policies to some extent, it more fundamentally strengthens the power of local bureaucrats, creating the potential for greater exploitation and larger-scale popular grievances in the long run.
JOP 88/2 pp. 509-525 2026-04-01 Original Social Density, Clientelism, and Community Benefits
Jeremy Spater, Erik Wibbels
Abstract
How does the social structure of a neighborhood affect the linkage strategies chosen by politicians? Our argument links the social centrality of individuals and the social density of neighborhoods to the incidence of individual-level clientelism and the contingent provision of neighborhood benefits, respectively. We test the resulting hypotheses using a combination of original network, experimental and nonexperimental survey data collected across 9,184 households in 217 slums across three cities in India. We find that socially central individuals are more likely to be targeted with private clientelism and that more socially dense neighborhoods are more likely to coordinate votes, attract benefits, and achieve the legal prerequisites for public services.