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Repeated Modifications in Policy Diffusion: Evidence From River Management Regulations in China's Cities

·817 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共政策 比较政治 中国研究 Policy Diffusion Policy Modification Local Government China River Management
PSJ 54/2 2026-03-10 Original Repeated Modifications in Policy Diffusion: Evidence From River Management Regulations in China's Cities Hu Xi, Hongtao Yi Abstract ABSTRACT Why do local governments repeatedly modify policies after their initial adoption? While policy diffusion research has focused on adoption, far less is known about why and how policies are revised over time. This study analyzes a city–year dataset of 293 Chinese prefecture‐level cities from 1986 to 2022, tracking both the adoption and subsequent modifications of River Management Regulations (RMR). A two‐stage modeling strategy combining a Probit model and a Prentice–Williams–Peterson Cox model is employed to analyze repeated modifications. The findings reveal three patterns. First, policy modifications at the provincial level and amendments to superior laws significantly increase the likelihood of local RMR revisions, whereas central‐level modifications do not exert a direct effect. Second, while neighboring jurisdictions' policy modifications do not significantly affect local revisions, adoption by neighboring late adopters generates a positive effect, indicating a form of “reverse diffusion.” Third, policies issued by local legislative branches are more likely to be modified than those issued by executive agencies, highlighting the role of institutional structure and procedural constraints. By shifting attention from adoption to repeated modification, this study extends policy diffusion theory and contributes to a broader understanding of post‐adoption policy dynamics in hierarchical and decentralized political systems.

Time Matters: Under/Overperformance Duration and Performance Improvements in the Public Sector

·565 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共行政 中国研究 Performance Feedback Temporal Dynamics Public Sector Performance Air Quality Ranking China
PAR — 2026-03-06 Original Time Matters: Under/Overperformance Duration and Performance Improvements in the Public Sector Shaowei Chen, Jianxia Wu Abstract ABSTRACT Prior research on public organizations' strategic responses to performance feedback has focused solely on the intensity of performance feedback while neglecting its temporal dimensions. This study aims to fill this gap by incorporating the lens of time and investigating how performance feedback duration affects performance improvements in the public sector. Drawing on various theoretical perspectives, we theorize an inverted U‐shaped relationship between underperformance (negative performance feedback) duration and public organizations' subsequent performance improvements, and a U‐shaped relationship for overperformance (positive performance feedback) duration. Empirical analyses using the case of China's official city air quality ranking provide evidence supporting our theory. Our findings reveal that “time” (duration) can shape public organizations' responses to performance feedback in nonlinear ways and help reconcile inconsistencies in the existing literature, highlighting the importance of incorporating temporal dimensions of performance to advance performance feedback theory in the public sector.

Bureaucratic Incentives and Government Responsiveness in China

·524 字·2 分钟
Polihot 公共行政 比较政治 中国研究 Bureaucratic Incentives Government Responsiveness Citizen Complaints Authoritarian Accountability China
GOV 39/2 2026-03-02 Original Bureaucratic Incentives and Government Responsiveness in China Haemin Jee Abstract ABSTRACT Citizen complaints have long been considered an important channel of communication between citizens and officials in authoritarian regimes. Existing explanations for responsiveness to citizen complaints in China, however, do not adequately consider the role of local bureaucratic incentives as a driver of responsiveness. This paper seeks to explain local government responsiveness to citizen demands through this lens. Original data of citizen complaints and government responses from a Chinese prefecture and its subordinate counties demonstrate that lower level officials are more likely to respond to citizen complaints when monitored by their superiors. On the other hand, they are less responsive on unmonitored forums. Thus, oversight by higher level officials may be important in increasing actual government responsiveness; citizen complaints alone may not be enough to spur government action. While recent studies emphasize authoritarian accountability arising through quasi‐democratic institutions, this paper suggests incentives of local political actors may condition the effectiveness of these institutions.

From Pricing Power to Autonomy: The Geopolitics of RMB-Denominated Oil Futures Benchmark

·491 字·1 分钟
Polihot 国际关系 政治经济学 中国研究 RMB Oil Futures Financial Statecraft Pricing Power Oil Benchmarks China
JCC — pp. 1-18 2026-02-27 Original From Pricing Power to Autonomy: The Geopolitics of RMB-Denominated Oil Futures Benchmark Alexandru-Stefan Goghie Abstract This article examines China’s introduction of RMB-denominated crude oil futures as an instrument of financial statecraft aimed at reshaping the geopolitical foundations of global oil pricing. While Brent and WTI dominate price discovery through their deep embedding in dollar-based financial infrastructures, China seeks to cultivate pricing power by relocating benchmark formation to domestic institutions and an RMB-denominated contract. The paper argues that this initiative is not merely a market innovation, but a strategic effort to reduce structural dependence on USD-centered benchmarks, mitigate exposure to US financial jurisdiction, and enhance autonomy amid intensifying geopolitical rivalry. By analyzing the architecture, evolution, and international uptake of the Shanghai INE contract, the article shows that pricing power constitutes a crucial and underexplored dimension of contemporary Chinese statecraft.