Central-Local Relations

CQ 266 pp. 325-344 2026-06-04 Original Bureaucratic Restructuring and the State-led (De-)Financialization of Local Governance in China Xuchen Zhang, Fenghua Pan Abstract Abstract State-led financialization has emerged as a salient feature of local governance in China, yet it remains underexplored through the lens of bureaucratic restructuring. This paper traces the evolution of local financial agencies since 2002 through four distinct stages: local financial offices ( jinrongban ), financial bureaus ( jinrongju ), financial regulatory bureaus ( jinrong jianguanju ) and financial commissions ( jinrongwei ). Initially, local governments established jinrongban to harness financial capital for regional development. By proactively connecting local firms with capital markets to facilitate corporate listings, they embedded financial logic into local governance, reflecting local state-led financialization. Subsequently, the central government formalized these bodies into jinrongju with expanded mandates, deepening state-led financialization. Later, it systematically devolved regulatory responsibilities and renamed them jinrong jianguanju , elevating regulatory functions to a top priority, illustrating how the central government selectively steered the direction of financialization. Ultimately, provincial agencies were reorganized into jinrongwei and stripped of development functions, while city-level counterparts were largely closed, signifying a shift towards central state-led de-financialization. This trajectory was driven by shifting central–local dynamics, as early bottom-up initiatives were superseded by top-down control. The bureaucratic restructuring examined in this study offers new insights into the state-led (de-)financialization of local governance in China.

JCC — pp. 1-17 2026-06-02 Original Filtered Policy Implementation: Evidence from Rural China Suyuan He, Weiye Wang Abstract Through tracing incidents of agricultural product looting, this paper reveals the political logic behind local governments’ paradoxical behavior of promoting farmland scaling-up while marginalizing smallholders under the potential political threat of deviating from central directives. This dilemma stems from the evolution of bureaucratic evaluation arrangements and broader societal changes. Under increasing pressure on target assessments and supervision, local governments resort to measures including exploiting smallholders’ welfare to fulfil compulsory agricultural production targets, despite the fact that both production and welfare are two-fold of the integral goal of the state’s strategy. These practices have led to the collapse of traditional agricultural communities and heightened conflicts between local residents and nonlocal large-scale producers, reshaping grassroots agrarian production patterns profoundly and irreversibly.