APSR — pp. 1-21 2026-11-06 Original The Influence of Police Unions in Local Elections: Evidence from U.S. Cities’ Spending and Performance
JOP 88/4 pp. 1496-1510 2026-10-01 Original Special Interest Trade-Offs: Campaign Finance Reforms and Religious Influence in Politics in Brazil
Melani Cammett, Lucas M. Novaes, Guadalupe Tuñón
JOP 88/4 pp. 1511-1526 2026-10-01 Original Fundraising Events and Nonideological Donation Motivations
Sean Kates, Sebastian Thieme
Abstract
Why do individual donors attend fundraising events, and, relatedly, why do candidates rely on events to finance their campaigns? Despite public concerns around this mode of donation, fundraising events have received little scholarly attention. We use campaign finance disclosures in four US states, which indicate event- and nonevent status of donations, linked to political candidates to examine two hypotheses. First, events help candidates draw on individual donors’ nonideological motivations, including material motivations. Second, events help candidates fundraise when ideological motivations are relatively low. We provide evidence that donors discount ideology when they attend events and link agenda powers of legislative incumbents to increases in event donations, including from individuals in related business sectors. Furthermore, we show that early donations from individuals are more likely to be made via events than later donations, especially for incumbents. Our results highlight implications of event fundraising for responsiveness, partisan polarization, and candidate selection.
JOP 88/4 pp. 1368-1385 2026-10-01 Original Family Ties as Corporate Power
Pablo Balán, Juan Dodyk, Ignacio Puente
Abstract
Policies interact with underlying social organizations, which can deflect their intended goals. One example is legislation aimed at curbing business influence. Can campaign finance regulation reduce the political power of economic actors? We identify a factor that may hinder its effectiveness: the social structure of organizations. We argue that such regulation generates cooperation dilemmas within firms’ leadership and propose that a specific organizational feature—family ties—can help resolve them. We evaluate this argument by studying a ban on corporate contributions in Brazil, using granular data on family ties in publicly traded firms. We show that, following the ban, members of firms’ controlling families substituted individual for corporate contributions. Moreover, we document peer effects in the contributions of family members, suggesting that family ties are a channel of political influence. These bifurcated effects illustrate how organizational structure can be a source of de facto power and offer a cautionary note to policymakers.
JOP 88/2 pp. 698-715 2026-04-01 Original Keep Winning with WinRed? Online Fundraising Platform as the Party’s Public Good
Seo-young Silvia Kim, Zhao Li