GOV 39/3 2026-04-16
Original The Paradox in Citizen's Views Toward Bureaucracy: Exploring Bureauphobia in More Depth
Zeinab Molavi, Hassan Danaeefard, Ali Hamidizadeh
Abstract
ABSTRACT This study investigates how Iranian citizens develop bureauphobia. The process was examined from the perspectives of 59 citizens using the grounded theory method. Data were collected through semi‐structured interviews, and Corbin and Strauss's constant comparison method was employed for data analysis. In the grounded process model, the core category was the cognitive dissonance, and other categories were: causal conditions—observational learning, media exaggeration, citizens' overgeneralization bias, and citizens' preexisting mental schema; intervening factors—economic conditions and the overall community atmosphere; contextual factors—the self‐defensive role of negative attitude, the value‐laden negative attitude, and adherence to negative attitude; strategies—self‐persuasion and selective avoidance; and consequences —cognitive and behavioral effects. The findings indicate that the negative image of the government is more psychological and less a result of citizens' evaluation of the actual performance of public bureaucracy. This study has theoretical and practical implications for bureaucracy theorists, policymakers, and government managers.
PA — 2026-04-07
Original Fighting Corruption Through Accountability? A Survey Experiment
Ming‐feng Kuo, Hsini Huang
Abstract
ABSTRACT Democratic Weberian bureaucracy is facing great challenges upholding public values as we see turbulent party politics disrupt merit‐based systems, causing bureaucrats' goal displacement and conflicting compliance under multiple accountability mechanisms. Using vignette experiment design, 555 Taiwanese public employees were surveyed to explore how legal, administrative, and social accountabilities influence the perception of black, gray, and white corruption. While respondents accurately identified corruption severity, accountability reminders diminish ethical judgments and are ineffective in explaining whistle‐blowing intention. The study revealed that organizational positions interact differently with accountability reminders in a Weberian bureaucracy. Findings highlight the need to cultivate ethical judgment to shift from external controls to trigger greater perceived accountability to combat corruption. This study sheds light on both felt accountability and corruption theories to reflect existing anti‐corruption strategies.
APSR — pp. 1-17 2026-04-07 Original Bureaucratic Resistance and Policy Inefficiency
KUN HEO, ELISA WIRSCHING
Abstract
Poor public service provision creates an electoral vulnerability for incumbent politicians. Under what conditions can bureaucrats exploit this to avoid reforms they dislike? We develop a model of electoral politics in which a politician must decide whether to enact a reform of uncertain value, and a voter evaluates the incumbent’s reform based on post-reform government service quality, which anti-reform bureaucrats can undermine. Bureaucratic resistance for political leverage is most likely to occur when voters are torn between the reform and the status quo. Resistance lowers the informational value of government service for voters and can lead to policy distortions and accountability loss. When reform is moderately popular, resistance leads to policy inefficiency by preventing beneficial reforms due to electoral risks and inducing ineffective reforms by offering bureaucrats as scapegoats. Our model identifies a distinct mechanism of bureaucratic power and its implications for policy and accountability.
JOP 88/2 pp. 787-804 2026-04-01 Original Bureaucrats in Congress: The Politics of Interbranch Information Sharing
Pamela Ban, Ju Yeon Park, Hye Young You
Abstract
(原文未提供摘要)
中文 国会中的官僚:跨部门信息共享的政治
Pamela Ban, Ju Yeon Park, Hye Young You
GOV 39/2 2026-03-15
Original Beyond Democratic Backsliding: Bureaucracy, Elite Dynamics and Administrative Change in Authoritarian Transitions
Kutsal Yesilkagit, Johan Christensen
Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper examines how political and administrative elites shape regime transformations under authoritarian rule, proposing an elite‐centered analytical perspective that complements prevailing accounts of “democratic backsliding.” We show how embedding political–administrative relations within a broader elite‐theoretical framework clarifies the mechanisms through which elite reconfiguration underwrites institutional erosion. Drawing on classical and contemporary elite theory, we argue that shifts in elite coalitions among politicians, bureaucrats, and economic actors drive regime changes more than institutional erosion or ideological movements. Through comparative historical analysis of interwar Italy and Germany, we illustrate distinct elite‐driven pathways to authoritarian consolidation: Mussolini's Italy involved strategic alliances with traditional elites, while Hitler's Germany pursued radical elite replacement. Our findings highlight the critical role of elite realignments in transforming institutions and economic policies, often maintaining a façade of electoral legitimacy. This elite‐theoretical approach offers nuanced insights into contemporary shifts toward autocratic governance, emphasizing the importance of analyzing elite networks and interactions to comprehend the deeper mechanics of political transformation. Our findings thus contribute to public administration scholarship by theorizing how elite realignments transform bureaucratic structures and alter the nature of political‐administrative relationships under authoritarian conditions.