PSJ 54/4 2026-11-05
Original When More Is More: Committee Overlap and the Diversity of Information in Problem Definition
Connor Dye
Abstract
ABSTRACT Congress relies on a fragmented bureaucracy to monitor complex problems, raising concerns over whether it can aggregate the diverse information needed for effective policy‐making. I argue that competition among committees with different institutional ties to agencies should produce informational diversity without any coordinating body. Analyzing 92,375 instances of agency testimony across 131 agencies from 1973 to 2021, I find that a greater number of committees examining a problem is consistently associated with a broader and less concentrated set of agencies supplying information. I find little evidence that this association is systematically moderated by public salience.
PAR — 2026-10-12
Original Promises, Threats, and Norms: A Mixed Methods Study on Bureaucratic Support for Public Participation
Jesse W. Campbell, Oscar Radyan Danar, Sanjay K. Pandey
PAR — 2026-09-29
Original Reply to Kettl: Beyond Bureaucracy: Why AI Demands a Fourth Way in Public Administration
Jack Baldwin, Tina Nabatchi
Abstract
ABSTRACT Kettl argues public administration faces a crisis rooted in widening gaps between scholars and practitioners and between the field's core ideas and current governance issues. We identify a critical example: artificial intelligence (AI) adoption in government. AI fundamentally transforms public organizations, redistributing tasks and discretion between humans and algorithms, embedding instrumental rationality into administrative processes, and reconfiguring authority structures. These developments challenge three longstanding pillars of public administration: bureaucratic neutrality, the politics‐administration dichotomy, and democratic governance. We argue that any proposed “Fourth Way” must center democratic resilience and technological stewardship, incorporating algorithmic transparency requirements and participatory governance structures that preserve public—and especially democratic—values.
APSR — pp. 1-21 2026-09-21 Original Imperial Aid and Tax Mobilization in Late Colonial Africa
DIDAC QUERALT
Abstract
In 1929, the British Empire launched a four-decade development initiative to modernize colonial economies without self-government. Known as the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, the program required colonial administrations to raise local taxes to cofinance development projects. This article shows that imperial aid expanded colonial taxation only after organizational reforms in the Colonial Service screened in officials who shared the metropole’s developmental agenda and made tax mobilization incentive-compatible with career advancement. Drawing on original data from 12 African colonies and extensive archival evidence, I show that aid increased tax revenues when patronage-based governors were replaced by career officers and promotion within the Colonial Service became conditional on fiscal performance. These findings highlight how bureaucratic incentives shaped the effectiveness of imperial aid and offer a new explanation for the expansion of fiscal capacity in late colonial Africa.
PMR — pp. 1-31 2026-09-21 Original Bricolage in bureaucracies: public leadership and bricolage behaviour in turbulent situations
Finn Kabatas, Rick Vogel
Abstract
Public employees increasingly face turbulent challenges in which principles such as foresight, planning, and consensus-seeking fall short. We examine bricolage as a robust governance strategy and conceptualize turbulence as a contextual moderator of the relationship between public leadership and bricolage behaviour. Based on survey data from 368 German public employees, the findings suggest that bricolage is less practiced under turbulent conditions. While rule-following leadership, contrary to expectations, becomes even more strongly and positively related to bricolage behaviour as conditions grow more turbulent, the positive association between accountability leadership and bricolage behaviour weakens substantially. Surprisingly, network governance leadership does not gain in importance. This study contributes to public administration research by further conceptualizing and exploring bricolage as a micro-level behavioural capacity in response to turbulence, by operationalizing turbulence as a graded situational stressor, and by demonstrating that turbulent contexts constitute a critical boundary condition for the exercise of public leadership.
PA — 2026-07-09
Original Resolving Agile Ambidexterity: Between Ambivalence, Adaptation, and Accommodation
Ines Mergel
Abstract
ABSTRACT Public bureaucracies address challenging and complex problems by applying agile work practices when standard operating procedures or routines fail. In these situations, public managers need to decide whether to exploit existing bureaucratic routines or explore novel solutions through non‐routine agile work practices. This study shows how public managers maneuver between different adoption decisions: (1) remain ambivalent and reject agile, (2) accommodate the needs of the bureaucracy and adjust agile work practices to align with administrative routines, or (3) adapt in an ambidextrous manner by becoming agile literate and choosing the appropriate work practices depending on the public management problem. This study contributes to the literature on agile governance by incorporating the notion of ambidexterity into the existing theory of 21st‐century bureaucracy.
AJPS — 2026-07-02
Original Bureaucrat assignments as instruments of political control: Theory and evidence from land administration officials in India
Anustubh Agnihotri, Aditya Dasgupta, Devesh Kapur
APSR — pp. 1-22 2026-06-22 Original Portraits of Power: Facial Appearance and the Tacit Domain of Political Selection in China
JUNYAN JIANG, SONGPO YANG
Abstract
As the epitome of modern, rational organizations, bureaucracies are often believed to select candidates based on rules and reason. We argue that intuitive—and even instinctive—assessments of candidates’ external appearances sometimes underpin seemingly rational and calculated decisions. Using a novel, AI-based algorithm that learns and reproduces human assessments of facial appearances at scale, we examine how perceived facial traits influence the careers of over four thousand mid- and senior-level Chinese officials. We find that officials who look more competent, trustworthy, and less aggressive enjoy significantly better promotion prospects and lower purge risk than their peers. Warmth-related traits (e.g., trustworthiness and non-aggressiveness) are especially valued at higher-level promotions and for male candidates. Additional analyses, including conjoint experiments with real officials, demonstrate that appearances’ influence over selection preferences is comparable to performance or political connections. These findings challenge the prevailing meritocratic and relation-based theories of bureaucratic selection and highlight the role of impressions in the workings of government institutions.
PAR 86/5 pp. 1213-1224 2026-06-21 Original Reclaiming Weber: Bureaucracy as Democracy's Last Line of Defense
Patricia Nemeth
Abstract
ABSTRACT Max Weber's rational–legal bureaucracy remains a vital safeguard amid populist backlash, civil service politicization, and democratic backsliding. This article reframes bureaucracy as a conditional democratic safeguard—one that depends on ethical orientation and professional integrity, not technical capacity alone. When legality is hollowed out through obedience or anticipatory compliance, institutions corrode from within. Evidence from recent cases of executive politicization illustrates how ethical substance erodes behind formally intact institutions. By integrating Weber's structural rationality with Waldo's claim that democracy is fundamentally an ethic requiring value‐laden judgment, the article develops the notion of a “compliance trap” and recasts public servants as ethical constitutional agents rather than passive implementers. It also advances a framework for bureaucratic renewal grounded in ethical discipline, participatory design, and professional autonomy, arguing that administrators must be prepared to exercise principled judgment when other democratic safeguards weaken.
JOP — 2026-05-18
Original Cadre networks and bureaucratic careers in autocracies
Alexander De Juan, Felix Haass, Jan H. Pierskalla
Abstract
Many autocracies employ classic Weberian bureaucratic structures with formalized recruitment systems for low-level bureaucrats. How successful are these systems in weeding out informal personal ties outside the control of the authoritarian elite? And, if low-level personal networks continue to matter, do they undermine regime interests or do they reflect regime preferences? We undertake the first empirical analysis of such networks, focusing on the case of the former German Democratic Republic. We draw on detailed biographical data on over 180,000 cadres to investigate how workplace-based cadre networks shaped promotion practices. Difference-in-differences models show that cadre networks help individuals' career trajectories. We also demonstrate that network-based promotions mirrored regime preferences, instead of contributing to decentralized cronyism. These findings help us to better understand how the persistence of informal promotion practices can aid autocrats in aligning bureaucratic apparatuses with regime interests.