Bureaucracy

PA — 2026-07-09 Original Resolving Agile Ambidexterity: Between Ambivalence, Adaptation, and Accommodation Ines Mergel Abstract ABSTRACT Public bureaucracies address challenging and complex problems by applying agile work practices when standard operating procedures or routines fail. In these situations, public managers need to decide whether to exploit existing bureaucratic routines or explore novel solutions through non‐routine agile work practices. This study shows how public managers maneuver between different adoption decisions: (1) remain ambivalent and reject agile, (2) accommodate the needs of the bureaucracy and adjust agile work practices to align with administrative routines, or (3) adapt in an ambidextrous manner by becoming agile literate and choosing the appropriate work practices depending on the public management problem. This study contributes to the literature on agile governance by incorporating the notion of ambidexterity into the existing theory of 21st‐century bureaucracy.

AJPS — 2026-07-02 Original Bureaucrat assignments as instruments of political control: Theory and evidence from land administration officials in India Anustubh Agnihotri, Aditya Dasgupta, Devesh Kapur

APSR — pp. 1-22 2026-06-22 Original Portraits of Power: Facial Appearance and the Tacit Domain of Political Selection in China JUNYAN JIANG, SONGPO YANG Abstract As the epitome of modern, rational organizations, bureaucracies are often believed to select candidates based on rules and reason. We argue that intuitive—and even instinctive—assessments of candidates’ external appearances sometimes underpin seemingly rational and calculated decisions. Using a novel, AI-based algorithm that learns and reproduces human assessments of facial appearances at scale, we examine how perceived facial traits influence the careers of over four thousand mid- and senior-level Chinese officials. We find that officials who look more competent, trustworthy, and less aggressive enjoy significantly better promotion prospects and lower purge risk than their peers. Warmth-related traits (e.g., trustworthiness and non-aggressiveness) are especially valued at higher-level promotions and for male candidates. Additional analyses, including conjoint experiments with real officials, demonstrate that appearances’ influence over selection preferences is comparable to performance or political connections. These findings challenge the prevailing meritocratic and relation-based theories of bureaucratic selection and highlight the role of impressions in the workings of government institutions.

PAR 86/5 pp. 1213-1224 2026-06-21 Original Reclaiming Weber: Bureaucracy as Democracy's Last Line of Defense Patricia Nemeth Abstract ABSTRACT Max Weber's rational–legal bureaucracy remains a vital safeguard amid populist backlash, civil service politicization, and democratic backsliding. This article reframes bureaucracy as a conditional democratic safeguard—one that depends on ethical orientation and professional integrity, not technical capacity alone. When legality is hollowed out through obedience or anticipatory compliance, institutions corrode from within. Evidence from recent cases of executive politicization illustrates how ethical substance erodes behind formally intact institutions. By integrating Weber's structural rationality with Waldo's claim that democracy is fundamentally an ethic requiring value‐laden judgment, the article develops the notion of a “compliance trap” and recasts public servants as ethical constitutional agents rather than passive implementers. It also advances a framework for bureaucratic renewal grounded in ethical discipline, participatory design, and professional autonomy, arguing that administrators must be prepared to exercise principled judgment when other democratic safeguards weaken.

JOP — 2026-05-18 Original Cadre networks and bureaucratic careers in autocracies Alexander De Juan, Felix Haass, Jan H. Pierskalla Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 威权政体中的干部网络与官僚职业生涯 Alexander De Juan, Felix Haass, Jan H. Pierskalla

GOV 39/3 2026-04-16 Original The Paradox in Citizen's Views Toward Bureaucracy: Exploring Bureauphobia in More Depth Zeinab Molavi, Hassan Danaeefard, Ali Hamidizadeh Abstract ABSTRACT This study investigates how Iranian citizens develop bureauphobia. The process was examined from the perspectives of 59 citizens using the grounded theory method. Data were collected through semi‐structured interviews, and Corbin and Strauss's constant comparison method was employed for data analysis. In the grounded process model, the core category was the cognitive dissonance, and other categories were: causal conditions—observational learning, media exaggeration, citizens' overgeneralization bias, and citizens' preexisting mental schema; intervening factors—economic conditions and the overall community atmosphere; contextual factors—the self‐defensive role of negative attitude, the value‐laden negative attitude, and adherence to negative attitude; strategies—self‐persuasion and selective avoidance; and consequences —cognitive and behavioral effects. The findings indicate that the negative image of the government is more psychological and less a result of citizens' evaluation of the actual performance of public bureaucracy. This study has theoretical and practical implications for bureaucracy theorists, policymakers, and government managers.

PA — 2026-04-07 Original Fighting Corruption Through Accountability? A Survey Experiment Ming‐feng Kuo, Hsini Huang Abstract ABSTRACT Democratic Weberian bureaucracy is facing great challenges upholding public values as we see turbulent party politics disrupt merit‐based systems, causing bureaucrats' goal displacement and conflicting compliance under multiple accountability mechanisms. Using vignette experiment design, 555 Taiwanese public employees were surveyed to explore how legal, administrative, and social accountabilities influence the perception of black, gray, and white corruption. While respondents accurately identified corruption severity, accountability reminders diminish ethical judgments and are ineffective in explaining whistle‐blowing intention. The study revealed that organizational positions interact differently with accountability reminders in a Weberian bureaucracy. Findings highlight the need to cultivate ethical judgment to shift from external controls to trigger greater perceived accountability to combat corruption. This study sheds light on both felt accountability and corruption theories to reflect existing anti‐corruption strategies.

APSR — pp. 1-17 2026-04-07 Original Bureaucratic Resistance and Policy Inefficiency KUN HEO, ELISA WIRSCHING Abstract Poor public service provision creates an electoral vulnerability for incumbent politicians. Under what conditions can bureaucrats exploit this to avoid reforms they dislike? We develop a model of electoral politics in which a politician must decide whether to enact a reform of uncertain value, and a voter evaluates the incumbent’s reform based on post-reform government service quality, which anti-reform bureaucrats can undermine. Bureaucratic resistance for political leverage is most likely to occur when voters are torn between the reform and the status quo. Resistance lowers the informational value of government service for voters and can lead to policy distortions and accountability loss. When reform is moderately popular, resistance leads to policy inefficiency by preventing beneficial reforms due to electoral risks and inducing ineffective reforms by offering bureaucrats as scapegoats. Our model identifies a distinct mechanism of bureaucratic power and its implications for policy and accountability.

JOP 88/2 pp. 787-804 2026-04-01 Original Bureaucrats in Congress: The Politics of Interbranch Information Sharing Pamela Ban, Ju Yeon Park, Hye Young You Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 国会中的官僚：跨部门信息共享的政治 Pamela Ban, Ju Yeon Park, Hye Young You

GOV 39/2 2026-03-15 Original Beyond Democratic Backsliding: Bureaucracy, Elite Dynamics and Administrative Change in Authoritarian Transitions Kutsal Yesilkagit, Johan Christensen Abstract ABSTRACT This paper examines how political and administrative elites shape regime transformations under authoritarian rule, proposing an elite‐centered analytical perspective that complements prevailing accounts of “democratic backsliding.” We show how embedding political–administrative relations within a broader elite‐theoretical framework clarifies the mechanisms through which elite reconfiguration underwrites institutional erosion. Drawing on classical and contemporary elite theory, we argue that shifts in elite coalitions among politicians, bureaucrats, and economic actors drive regime changes more than institutional erosion or ideological movements. Through comparative historical analysis of interwar Italy and Germany, we illustrate distinct elite‐driven pathways to authoritarian consolidation: Mussolini's Italy involved strategic alliances with traditional elites, while Hitler's Germany pursued radical elite replacement. Our findings highlight the critical role of elite realignments in transforming institutions and economic policies, often maintaining a façade of electoral legitimacy. This elite‐theoretical approach offers nuanced insights into contemporary shifts toward autocratic governance, emphasizing the importance of analyzing elite networks and interactions to comprehend the deeper mechanics of political transformation. Our findings thus contribute to public administration scholarship by theorizing how elite realignments transform bureaucratic structures and alter the nature of political‐administrative relationships under authoritarian conditions.