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The Politicization of Bureaucrats: Evidence from Brazil

JOP 88/2 pp. 554-571 2026-04-01 Original The Politicization of Bureaucrats: Evidence from Brazil Anderson Frey, Rogerio Santarrosa Abstract In developing countries, incumbents commonly exercise political influence over bureaucrats through monitoring or patronage hiring. We investigate a new politicization channel: a phenomenon where bureaucrats join political parties while in office. First, with a regression discontinuity design and administrative data on the universe of Brazilian municipal bureaucrats, we identify an incumbency advantage in their politicization. Second, we find larger effects for a special set of bureaucrats: the ones that interviewed households for enrollment into Bolsa Família (BF). Third, we show that these effects are even stronger for interviewers highly exposed to voters and in municipalities where BF was expanded. Our findings suggest a policy-driven logic for this politicization: voter-facing bureaucrats who deliver salient policies accumulate electoral capital, which is converted into rents by joining the incumbent political networks.

Feeding the Coalition: How Presidents Use State Banks to Buy Legislative Support for Governability

GOV 39/2 2026-03-11 Original Feeding the Coalition: How Presidents Use State Banks to Buy Legislative Support for Governability Rodrigo B. DeMello, Carlos Pereira Abstract ABSTRACT This paper develops and tests a theory of how presidents use government agencies to manage legislative coalitions in multiparty presidential systems. We argue that agency decisions—particularly subsidized credit from state‐owned development banks—function as retail coalition goods that sustain legislative support. Legislators are more likely to back the president when agency resources benefit subnational politicians who are both partisan allies and vital to their reelection networks. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close mayoral elections in Brazil and loan‐level data from the National Development Bank (BNDES), we find that municipalities governed by coalition‐aligned mayors receive significantly more favorable loan terms. Linking these data to roll‐call votes, we show that legislators become more supportive of the president after loans are granted in their electoral strongholds managed by co‐partisan mayors. These findings reveal how distributive agency decisions translate into legislative support, integrating bureaucratic discretion into theories of coalition management.