GOV 39/3 2026-04-24
Original Varieties of Authoritarian Policymaking: Housing Policy Across Dictatorships
Emilia Simison
Abstract
ABSTRACT Public policies are expected to vary across regime types, but this association remains inconclusive even when further differentiating within types of authoritarian regimes. Focusing on the theoretical mechanisms behind the expected associations between regime type and policy, I propose a novel framework to analyze policymaking and outputs across regimes. I claim that policymaking and how close its results are from the dictator's goal in any authoritarian regime depends on the extent and ways in which the space for contestation over policy is constrained. I apply this framework to an in‐depth historical comparative analysis of policymaking and outputs in three Latin American military‐led regimes. I show that differences in how the space for contestation was constrained in each explains differences in their policymaking processes and resulting policies despite the shared regime type, policy challenges and goals.
JOP — 2026-04-17
Original Meritocracy and Autocratic Power-Sharing: A Historical Perspective
Clair Yang, Yasheng Huang, Zhaomin Li
Abstract
This paper proposes meritocracy as a power-sharing institution in authoritarian regimes, particularly in weakly institutionalized environments. Contrary to what Enlightenment scholars believed, our evidence shows that meritocratic institutions were not uncommon in historical states and were often associated with absolute rulers. Using a formal model, we demonstrate that meritocracy benefits rulers by enabling them to co-opt high-ability agents, and it can remain credible even without third-party enforcement mechanisms. Unlike other power-sharing institutions, such as parliaments, which function more effectively under weaker rulers, meritocracy is more likely to emerge endogenously under strong rulers and remains self-reinforcing over time. We test these theoretical predictions using historical case studies and empirical analysis of a panel of 289 historical polities. The results confirm a positive association between meritocracy and autocracy. We believe that meritocracy can fill the gap in the literature to explain power-sharing in many historical absolute regimes.
JOP 88/2 pp. 493-508 2026-04-01 Original The Supply of Conspiracism in State-Controlled Media
Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Richard A. Nielsen, David Romney
Abstract
When, and why, do governments promote conspiracy theories and use conspiracist language in official media? We build on claims that autocrats use misinformation for diversionary purposes by showing that the level of threat a regime faces affects conspiracism: a mix of “classic” conspiracy theorizing and conspiratorial language. Governments facing threats may attempt to stave them off by promoting conspiracy theories in state media. By contrast, secure governments are not as prone to conspiracism because it can be politically costly in the long term. We test our arguments by examining conspiracism in Egypt’s print media between 2005 and 2018. When the government faced threats, the state-controlled newspaper printed more conspiracism than its independent counterpart. This relationship is moderated by changes in Egypt’s government: the state newspaper supplied less conspiracism during a brief period following relatively free and fair presidential elections.
WP 78/2 pp. 377-418 2026-04-01 Original Rightful Challengers: How Chinese Criminal Defense Lawyers Encourage Judge-Prosecutor Disagreement
Yue Hou, Jieun Kim
Abstract
abstract: In autocracies, courts are often perceived as tools of the autocrats, with lawyers viewed as lacking influence. The authors reassess these assumptions by examining criminal defense lawyers as "rightful challengers" within China's legal system. Analyzing an original data set of drug cases in Chinese criminal courts from 2014 through 2018, the authors find that when a lawyer is present, judges are three times more likely to reject prosecutors' arguments and twice as likely to deviate from prosecutors' sentencing recommendations. The deviation on average results in sentences that are shorter than the prosecutor's recommendation—shorter by more than two months in addition to the already shorter sentences judges give compared to prosecutors' recommendations. These findings suggest that lawyers can exert a substantial impact on judicial decisions by encouraging judge-prosecutor disagreement, particularly in cases that are less politically sensitive. Original interviews and close examination of lawyers' arguments reveal that the quality of defense is crucial for understanding lawyers' effectiveness in influencing court decisions. These results highlight how seemingly powerless societal actors, such as lawyers, can act as rightful challengers to powerful state actors within authoritarian regimes.
WP 78/2 pp. 207-250 2026-04-01 Original Reshuffles or Dismissals? The Logic of Elite Management and Autocratic Survival
Alexander Baturo, Roman-Gabriel Olar
Abstract
abstract: Co-optation and repression are central to understanding authoritarian power sharing, but how autocrats implement these strategies with individual elites remains underexplored. The article proposes a theoretical framework conceptualizing dictators as managers of their ruling coalitions who routinely appoint, dismiss, promote, demote, shuffle, or reappoint elites for a mixture of strategic, nonstrategic, or even mundane reasons. The authors argue that autocrats have agency in choosing between dismissals and reshuffles as general elite management strategies. In the process, they alter the information environment and elite incentives with consequences for their own survival. Although dismissals as a general policy reduce elites' power, they also increase intraregime conflict and uncertainty and tend to have adverse effects on ruler survival. In contrast, reshuffles prevent elite coordination but ensure that elites have a stake in regime continuity. These arguments are tested using novel measures of dismissals and reshuffles in autocratic regimes and communist politburos while also considering the mechanisms and alternative explanations driving the results. The findings suggest that autocratic survival relies more on mundane and nonviolent elite management than seen in the predominantly conflictual accounts of authoritarian politics.
AJPS — 2026-03-24
Original Unraveling authoritarian reform decision‐making: A metacognitive–subcognitive model