Authoritarianism

CQ — pp. 1-18 2026-08-28 Original Subversive Amplification: Online Dissent and the Limits of Information Control in China Christian Göbel Abstract Abstract Intensified information control severely constrains digital contention in China, yet online mass events occasionally occur. Using a dataset of 274,721 Weibo messages, this study examines mobilization, coordination and grievance articulation during a two-day episode of online dissent in the aftermath of the 2022 Urumqi residential building fire, which preceded the White Paper protests. It argues that users were activated by public communication failures that transformed manifold grievances into outrage, and that the associated hashtags provided anchors to which criticism could be attached. In a process this study terms “subversive amplification,” concentrated engagement amplified the hashtags’ visibility, and with it the critical content attached to them. However, absent the unifying function of opinion leaders, grievance articulation remained fragmented and did not converge on unified demands. The case illustrates the inherent vulnerabilities of information control but also the conditions and limits of their exploitation.

AJPS — 2026-07-01 Original State surveillance and collective dissent Gaétan Nandong Abstract Abstract State surveillance facilitates the collection of intelligence on dissidents while simultaneously providing information about the value of the status quo. I study this trade‐off in a context where an uninformed government must decide whether to repress. Because citizens expect more informed governments to enact greater repression, autocratic surveillance can create a climate of fear. However, surveillance can also stimulate dissent when citizens have access to public information. State surveillance gives citizens an opportunity to coordinate, even in the absence of a preference for such coordination. Surveillance can amplify dissent by enhancing citizens' motivations for political activism aimed at drawing the government's attention to political and economic issues. Coordination distorts government learning, resulting in lower expected levels of repression. The analysis further indicates that the effectiveness of advanced surveillance technology depends on expectations regarding repression, thereby underscoring a psychological aspect of state control.

JOP — 2026-05-18 Original Cadre networks and bureaucratic careers in autocracies Alexander De Juan, Felix Haass, Jan H. Pierskalla Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 威权政体中的干部网络与官僚职业生涯 Alexander De Juan, Felix Haass, Jan H. Pierskalla

JOP — 2026-04-28 Original Propaganda of Democratic Flaws and Its Impact on Regime Evaluations in Autocracies Rex Weiye Deng Abstract （原文未提供摘要） 中文 民主缺陷的宣传及其对威权政体中政权评价的影响 Rex Weiye Deng 摘要 原文未提供摘要 关键词 威权主义、政治宣传、政权评价、民主缺陷、政治合法性、公众舆论

GOV 39/3 2026-04-24 Original Varieties of Authoritarian Policymaking: Housing Policy Across Dictatorships Emilia Simison Abstract ABSTRACT Public policies are expected to vary across regime types, but this association remains inconclusive even when further differentiating within types of authoritarian regimes. Focusing on the theoretical mechanisms behind the expected associations between regime type and policy, I propose a novel framework to analyze policymaking and outputs across regimes. I claim that policymaking and how close its results are from the dictator's goal in any authoritarian regime depends on the extent and ways in which the space for contestation over policy is constrained. I apply this framework to an in‐depth historical comparative analysis of policymaking and outputs in three Latin American military‐led regimes. I show that differences in how the space for contestation was constrained in each explains differences in their policymaking processes and resulting policies despite the shared regime type, policy challenges and goals.

JOP — 2026-04-17 Original Meritocracy and Autocratic Power-Sharing: A Historical Perspective Clair Yang, Yasheng Huang, Zhaomin Li Abstract This paper proposes meritocracy as a power-sharing institution in authoritarian regimes, particularly in weakly institutionalized environments. Contrary to what Enlightenment scholars believed, our evidence shows that meritocratic institutions were not uncommon in historical states and were often associated with absolute rulers. Using a formal model, we demonstrate that meritocracy benefits rulers by enabling them to co-opt high-ability agents, and it can remain credible even without third-party enforcement mechanisms. Unlike other power-sharing institutions, such as parliaments, which function more effectively under weaker rulers, meritocracy is more likely to emerge endogenously under strong rulers and remains self-reinforcing over time. We test these theoretical predictions using historical case studies and empirical analysis of a panel of 289 historical polities. The results confirm a positive association between meritocracy and autocracy. We believe that meritocracy can fill the gap in the literature to explain power-sharing in many historical absolute regimes.

JOP 88/2 pp. 493-508 2026-04-01 Original The Supply of Conspiracism in State-Controlled Media Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Richard A. Nielsen, David Romney Abstract When, and why, do governments promote conspiracy theories and use conspiracist language in official media? We build on claims that autocrats use misinformation for diversionary purposes by showing that the level of threat a regime faces affects conspiracism: a mix of “classic” conspiracy theorizing and conspiratorial language. Governments facing threats may attempt to stave them off by promoting conspiracy theories in state media. By contrast, secure governments are not as prone to conspiracism because it can be politically costly in the long term. We test our arguments by examining conspiracism in Egypt’s print media between 2005 and 2018. When the government faced threats, the state-controlled newspaper printed more conspiracism than its independent counterpart. This relationship is moderated by changes in Egypt’s government: the state newspaper supplied less conspiracism during a brief period following relatively free and fair presidential elections.

WP 78/2 pp. 377-418 2026-04-01 Original Rightful Challengers: How Chinese Criminal Defense Lawyers Encourage Judge-Prosecutor Disagreement Yue Hou, Jieun Kim Abstract abstract: In autocracies, courts are often perceived as tools of the autocrats, with lawyers viewed as lacking influence. The authors reassess these assumptions by examining criminal defense lawyers as "rightful challengers" within China's legal system. Analyzing an original data set of drug cases in Chinese criminal courts from 2014 through 2018, the authors find that when a lawyer is present, judges are three times more likely to reject prosecutors' arguments and twice as likely to deviate from prosecutors' sentencing recommendations. The deviation on average results in sentences that are shorter than the prosecutor's recommendation—shorter by more than two months in addition to the already shorter sentences judges give compared to prosecutors' recommendations. These findings suggest that lawyers can exert a substantial impact on judicial decisions by encouraging judge-prosecutor disagreement, particularly in cases that are less politically sensitive. Original interviews and close examination of lawyers' arguments reveal that the quality of defense is crucial for understanding lawyers' effectiveness in influencing court decisions. These results highlight how seemingly powerless societal actors, such as lawyers, can act as rightful challengers to powerful state actors within authoritarian regimes.

WP 78/2 pp. 207-250 2026-04-01 Original Reshuffles or Dismissals? The Logic of Elite Management and Autocratic Survival Alexander Baturo, Roman-Gabriel Olar Abstract abstract: Co-optation and repression are central to understanding authoritarian power sharing, but how autocrats implement these strategies with individual elites remains underexplored. The article proposes a theoretical framework conceptualizing dictators as managers of their ruling coalitions who routinely appoint, dismiss, promote, demote, shuffle, or reappoint elites for a mixture of strategic, nonstrategic, or even mundane reasons. The authors argue that autocrats have agency in choosing between dismissals and reshuffles as general elite management strategies. In the process, they alter the information environment and elite incentives with consequences for their own survival. Although dismissals as a general policy reduce elites' power, they also increase intraregime conflict and uncertainty and tend to have adverse effects on ruler survival. In contrast, reshuffles prevent elite coordination but ensure that elites have a stake in regime continuity. These arguments are tested using novel measures of dismissals and reshuffles in autocratic regimes and communist politburos while also considering the mechanisms and alternative explanations driving the results. The findings suggest that autocratic survival relies more on mundane and nonviolent elite management than seen in the predominantly conflictual accounts of authoritarian politics.

AJPS — 2026-03-24 Original Unraveling authoritarian reform decision‐making: A metacognitive–subcognitive model